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Equalizing or Disequalizing Lifetime Earnings Differentials? 
Earnings Mobility in the EU: 1994-2001 
 
Do EU citizens have an increased opportunity to improve their position in the distribution of 
lifetime earnings? To what extent does earnings mobility work to equalize/disequalize longer-
term earnings relative to cross-sectional inequality and how does it differ across the EU? Our 
basic assumption is that mobility measured over a horizon of 8 years is a good proxy for 
lifetime mobility. We used the Shorrocks (1978) and the Fields (2008) index. Moreover, we 
explored the impact of differentials attrition on the two indices. The Fields index is affected to 
a larger extent by differential attrition than the Shorrocks index, but the overall conclusions 
are not altered. Based on the Shorrocks (1978) index men across EU have an increasing 
mobility in the distribution of lifetime earnings as they advance in their career. Based on the 
Fields index (2008) the equalizing impact of mobility increases over the lifetime in all 
countries, except Portugal, where it turns negative for long horizons. Thus, Portugal is the 
only country where mobility acts as a disequalizer of lifetime differentials. The highest lifetime 
mobility is recorded in Denmark, followed by UK, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Italy, France, Spain, Germany, and the lowest, Portugal. The highest mobility as equalizer of 
longer term inequality is recorded in Ireland and Denmark, followed by France and Belgium 
with similar values, then UK, Greece, Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Italy. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Do EU citizens have an increased opportunity to improve their position in the distribution of 
lifetime earnings? To what extent does earnings mobility work to equalize/disequalize longer-
term earnings relative to cross-sectional inequality and how does it differ across the EU?  
These questions are relevant in the context of the EU labour market policy changes that took 
place after 1995 under the incidence of the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy, which recommended 
policies to increase wage flexibility, lower non-wage labour costs and allow relative wages to 
reflect better individual differences in productivity and local labour market conditions. (OECD, 
2004) Following these reforms, the labour market performance improved in some countries and 
deteriorated in others, with heterogeneous consequences for cross-sectional earnings inequality 
and earnings mobility. Averaged across the OECD, however, gross earnings inequality increased 
after 1994. (OECD, 2006)  
To explore the possible lifetime inequality consequences of these labour market changes, one has 
to  expand  the  typical  cross-sectional  view  usually  taken  in  cross-national  comparisons  of 
earnings distribution because a simple cross-sectional picture of earnings inequality is inadequate 
in capturing the true degree of inequality faced by individuals during their lifetime. The welfare 
implications  of  any  labour  market  changes  should  to  be  analysed  in  a  lifetime  perspective 
because lifetime earnings reflect to a larger extent the differences in the opportunities faced by 
individuals.  
The lifetime approach faces a huge impediment: the scarcity of lifetime earnings. This motivated 
the  study  of  economic  mobility,  viewed  as  the  link  between  short  and  long-term  earnings 
differentials: a cross-sectional snapshot of income distribution overstates lifetime inequality to a 
degree that depends on the degree of earnings mobility. (Lillard, 1977; Atkinson, Bourguignon, 
and Morrisson, 1992; Creedy, 1998) If countries have different earnings mobility levels, then 
single-year inequality country rankings may lead to a misleading picture of long-term inequality 
ranking. To support this statement, Creedy (1998), conducted a simulation study to examine the 
relationship between cross-sectional and lifetime income distributions. His conclusion was that 
simple  inferences about lifetime  income distributions cannot be  made on the  basis of cross-
sectional distributions alone, dismissing the conclusions drawn by the OECD (1996) report. 4 
 
Some people argue that rising annual inequality does not necessarily have negative implications. 
This statement relies on the “offsetting mobility” argument, which states that if there has been a 
sufficiently large simultaneous increase in mobility, the inequality of income measured over a 
longer period of time, such as lifetime income or permanent income - can be lower despite the 
rise  in annual  inequality, with a positive  impact on social  welfare. This statement, however, 
holds only under the assumption that individuals are not averse to income variability, future risk 
or  multi-period  inequality.  (Creedy  and  Wilhelm,  2002;  Gottschalk  and  Spolaore,  2002) 
Therefore, there is not a complete agreement in the literature on the value judgement of income 
mobility. (Atkinson et al., 1992) 
Those that value income mobility positively perceive it in two ways: as a goal in its own right or 
as an instrument to another end. The goal of having a mobile society is linked to the goal of 
securing equality of opportunity in the labour market and of having a more flexible and efficient 
economy. (Friedman, 1962; Atkinson et al., 1992) The instrumental justification for mobility 
takes place in the context of achieving distributional equity: lifetime equity depends on the extent 
of movement up and down the earnings distribution over the lifetime. (Atkinson et al., 1992) In 
this line of thought, Friedman (1962) underlined the role of social mobility in reducing lifetime 
earnings  differentials  between  individuals,  by  allowing  them  to  change  their  position  in  the 
income distribution over time.  
Thus earnings mobility is perceived in the literature as a way out of poverty. In the absence of 
mobility the same  individuals remain stuck at the bottom of the earnings distribution, hence 
annual earnings differentials are transformed into lifetime differentials.  
Using ECHP over the period 1994-2001, we explore earnings mobility across 14 EU countries to 
identify  whether  mobility  operates  as  an  equalizer  or  disequalizer  of  lifetime  earnings 
differentials, a question much neglected at the EU level. Our paper contributes to the existing 
literature in three ways. First, by exploring a different facet of mobility – as an equalizer or 
disequalizer of lifetime earnings differentials -, we complement Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009) 
findings on the evolution of earnings mobility over time across the EU, thus filling part of the 
gap in the study of earnings mobility at the EU level. Second, we apply a new class of measures 
of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes - developed by Fields (2008) – in comparison 
to the well-known measure developed by Shorrocks (1978).  5 
 
Third, unlike previous studies that rely on a fully balanced sample to explore mobility (only 
those individuals that record positive earnings independent of the sub-period), we extend the 
analysis by including the results for the unbalanced sample over different sub-periods. By doing 
so, we want to explore mobility as equalizer of longer term incomes not only for the people that 
remain employed over the entire sample period, but also for those that move into and out of 
employment. Focusing only on the fully balanced sample might bias the estimation of mobility 
due to the overestimation of earnings persistency.  Moreover, besides the employment status, 
there  are  other  factors  determining  panel  attrition.  All  in  all,  this  exercise  provides  is  an 
interesting  check  of  the  impact  of  differential  attrition  on  the  study  of  earnings  mobility  as 
equalizer of longer term differentials using the Shorrock and the Fields index.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The concept of mobility as an equalizer of longer term income is an old one, complementing 
mobility-as-time-independence, positional movement, share movement, non-directional income 
movement, and directional income movement. (Fields, 2008) The number of comparative studies 
on earnings mobility as a source of equalization of longer term income is limited because of the 
lack of sufficiently long comparable panel cross-country data. To investigate the link between 
longitudinal earnings mobility and the reduction in long-term earnings inequality most studies 
used the Shorrocks index (Shorrocks, 1978). One of the main critiques regarding this index is 
that it treats equalizing and disequalizing changes in essentially identical fashion. (Benabou and 
Ok, 2001; Fields, 2008)  
Most of the existing studies focus on the comparison between the US and a small number of 
European  countries.  OECD  (1996,  1997)  presented  a  variety  of  comparisons  of  earnings 
inequality and mobility across the OECD countries over the period 1986-1991. They included 
also  the  Shorrocks  mobility  index  and  concluded  that  the  results  vary  depending  on  the 
inequality index used for computing the Shorrocks index. This sensitivity was investigated more 
in depth by Jarvis and Jenkins (1998), which concluded that measures focusing on the tails of the 
distribution (e.g. Theil)  shows greater mobility compared with the situation when more weight is 
given to the middle of the distribution (e.g. Gini). 6 
 
Burkhauser  and  Poupore (1997)  using  GSOEP between  1983  and  1988  compared  long-term 
inequality in Germany and the US. To evaluate the extent to which mobility reduces longer term 
differentials,  they  used  the  Shorrocks(1978)  index  based  on  the  Theil  index.  Their  findings 
identified a higher mobility in Germany than in the US for all time periods. 
Aaberge, Bjorklund, Jantti, Palme, Pedersen, Smith, and Wannemo (2002) compared income 
(family income, disposable income and earnings) inequality and mobility in the Scandinavian 
countries and the United Stated during 1980-1990. They used the Shorrocks (1978) index based 
on the Gini index and found low mobility levels for all countries, with higher values for the US 
only for long accounting periods. Despite the higher mobility, independent of the accounting 
period,  they  found  that  earnings  inequality  is  higher  in  the  US  than  in  the  Scandinavian 
countries.  
Hofer and Weber (2002) looked at mobility in Austria between 1986-1991 using among other 
indices also the Shorrocks index calculated using the Gini, the Theil and Mean log deviation 
index. They compared their results with the OECD (1996, 1997). In Austria they found a weak 
equalization  effect  of  long-term  mobility  over  the  selected  period  compared  with  Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US. Moreover they underlined that “except the Austrian 
case, country rankings in this panel depends on the chosen inequality index and there emerges no 
clear picture which countries are the most mobile or the most immobile”.  
Gregg and Vittori (2008), starting from the approach proposed by Schluter and Trede (2003) 
developed  a  continuous  alternative  measure  of  “Shorrocks”  mobility  which  first,  allows  to 
identify  mobility  over  different  parts  of  the  earnings  distribution  and  second,  to  distinguish 
between mobility that tends to reduce or increase the level of permanent or long-term inequality. 
They focused on ECHP data on annual earnings for four countries - Denmark, Germany, Spain 
and the UK. Mobility was found to equalize long-term differentials. Denmark had the highest 
mobility, steaming mainly from the middle and top parts of the distribution, whereas the lowest 
was found in Germany. 
Most recently, Fields (2008) developed a new index to explore mobility as an equalizer of longer 
term income, which unlike Shorrocks index, is able to identify whether longitudinal mobility is 
equalizing or disequalizing long-term earnings differentials. The results for the United States and 
France showed that the new index picks up different trends compared with the Shorrocks index. 7 
 
Income mobility was found to equalize longer-term incomes among U.S. men in the 1970s but 
not in the 1980s and 1990s. In France, income mobility has been equalizing since the late 1960s, 
with a higher degree of equalization in more recent years.  
At the EU level, no study explored in a comparative setting earnings mobility as an equalizer of 
longer-term  inequality  using  a  panel  longer  than  six  years.  Moreover,  except  for  the  short 
exercise in Fields (2008), The Fields index, has not been applied to another Europoean country 
or in a comparative setting at the EU level. We argue that the Fields and the Shorrocks indices 
provide complementary pieces of information regarding the link between longitudinal mobility 
and long-term earnings differentials. By exploiting the 8 years of panel in ECHP, and coupling 
the information provided by the two indices, our paper aims to fill part of that gap and to make a 
substantive contribution to the literature on cross-national comparisons of longitudinal mobility 
at the EU level. Moreover, the balanced and unbalanced approach allows identifying the impact 
of differential attrition on measuring long-term mobility and also which of the two indices is the 
most sensitive. 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
It is recognized in the literature that a snapshot of the distribution exaggerates the true degree of 
inequality to a degree that depends on the mobility of earnings. (Atkinson et al., 1992) The core 
question that arises is whether low pay is persistent, meaning that the same people are stuck at 
the bottom of the income distribution, or there is a transitory component, meaning that people 
change their position in the income distribution over time. To answer this question, we focus on 
a  balanced  panel  for  all  countries  over  the  sample  period.  This  will  be  referred  to  as  the 
“balanced” approach.  
To check  for the impact of differentials  attrition, we consider also unbalanced panels across 
different sub-periods. For example, the mobility index for 1994-1998 is based on individuals 
with positive earnings  in each  year between 1994 and 1998, whereas the  mobility  index  for 
1994-2001 uses the balanced sample between 1994 and 2001. This will be referred to as the 




As noted also by Pen (1971), for a thorough understanding of the personal income distribution it 
is necessary to have an insight into the vertical mobility. One way to create a bridge between 
vertical mobility and personal income distribution is to measure the extent of mobility in terms 
of  the  proportion  to  which  it  reduces  lifetime  earnings  inequality  compared  with  annual 






















    (1) 
where     represents individual annual earnings,    time   = 1,…, ,   is an inequality index that 
is  a  strictly  convex  function  of  incomes  relative  to the  mean
2,  (∑    )  
      the  inequality  of 
lifetime income,    the share of earnings in year t of the total earnings over a T year period and 
 (   ) the cross-sectional annual inequality.    ranges from 0 (perfect mobility) to 1 (complete 
rigidity).
3 There is complete income rigidity if lifetime inequality is equal to the weighted sum of 
individual period income inequalities, meaning that everybody holds their position in the income 
distribution from period to period. Perfect mobility is achieved when everybody has the same 
average lifetime income, meaning that there is a complete reversal of positions in the income 
distribution. The degree of mobility can be computed as follows: 
1 T T M R = −  
Under Shorrocks (1978)’s definition, mobility is regarded as the degree to which equalisation 
occurs as the observation period is extended. This definition is very important from an economic 
point of view because it provides a way of identifying those countries that exhibit a high annual 
income inequality, but fares better when a longer period of time is considered. If a country A has 
both greater annual inequality and greater rigidity than country B, it will be more unequal than B 
                                                              
1 The formula applies for a cohort of constant size. 
2 This is the condition that must be fulfilled by the inequality index for the inequality (Atkinson et al., 1992) to hold. 
3 To compute this index only individuals that are present in all years are considered.  9 
 
whatever  period  is  chosen  for  comparison.  But  if  A  exhibits  more  mobility,  this  may  be 
sufficient to change the rankings when longer periods are considered. (Shorrocks, 1978).  
Because our data only covers eight years, the full equalising effect of mobility over the working 
lifetime is not captured. Some conclusions, however, can be drawn based on a horizon of 8 years.  
The measures of earnings mobility are closely related to the importance of the permanent and 
transitory  components  of  earnings.  Following  the  terminology  introduced  by  Friedman  and 
Kuznets (1954), individual earnings are composed of a permanent and a transitory component, 
assumed  to  be  independent  of  each  other.  The  permanent  component  of  earnings  reflects 
personal  characteristics,  education,  training  and  other  systematic  elements.  The  transitory 
component captures the chance and other factors influencing earnings in a particular period and 
is expected to average out over time. Following the structure of  individual earnings, overall 
inequality at any point in time is composed from inequality in the transitory component and 
inequality  in  the  permanent  component  of  earnings.  The  evolution  of  the  overall  earnings 
inequality is determined by the cumulative changes in the two inequality components.  
An increase in the cross-sectional earnings inequality could reflect a rise in the permanent and/or 
transitory  component  of  earnings  inequality.  The  rise  in  the  inequality  in  the  permanent 
component  of  earnings  may  be  consistent  with  increasing  returns  to  education,  on-the-job 
training and other persistent abilities that are among the main determinants of the permanent 
component of earnings. (Mincer, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1974; Hause, 1980). The increase in the 
inequality in the transitory component of earnings may be attributed to the weakening of the 
labour market institutions (e.g. unions, government wage regulation, internal labour markets) 
which increases earnings exposion to shocks. Overall, the increase in the return to persistent 
skills is expected to have a much larger impact on long-run earnings inequality than an increase 
in the transitory component of earnings. (Katz and Autor, 1999) 
In  order  to  make  inferences  concerning  the  sources  of  mobility,  meaning  whether  income 
changes  were  determined  by  large  variations  in  transitory  earnings  and  small  variations  in 
permanent earnings or vice-versa, we construct the stability profile or the rigidity curve, which 
plots the rigidity measure  T R  against different time horizons. A mobile earnings structure is 
represented by a stability profile that declines with time away from the immobility horizontal 
line, where  1 T R = . If incomes changes are purely due to transitory effects, relative incomes will 10 
 
rapidly  approach  their  permanent  values  and  there  will  then  be  no  substantial  further 
equalisation. The stability profile will therefore tend to become horizontal after the first few 
years. If income changes are due to more mobility in permanent incomes, the stability profile 
will continue to decline as the aggregation period is extended. (Shorrocks, 1978) 
3.2.Fields 
To recall, Shorrocks (1978) conceptualized income mobility as the opposite of income rigidity. 
As highlighted by Benabou and Ok (2001) and Fields (2008), the main limitation of this measure 
was that it does not quantify the direction and the extent of the difference between inequality of 
longer-term income and inequality of base year income, meaning that it treats equalizing and 
disequalizing changes in essentially identical fashion. Fields (2008) explained with the following 
example, which uses Gini as the inequality index. The mobility index,  T M , for a “Gates-gains” 
mobility process (100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 30000) equals 4.99·10
-5 , 5.91 10
-5 for a “Gates-
loses” mobility process and 0 for “no change”. The ranking in mobility is “Gates-loses”, “Gates-
gains” and “no change”, but neither the sign nor the relative magnitude of  T M  conveys any 
information whether mobility is equalizing or disequalizing in a lifetime perspective.  
Fields  (2008)  developed  a  mobility  measure  which  circumvents  this  limitations,  capturing 






ε = −     (2), 
where  a  a is the vector of average incomes,  yl is the vector of base-year incomes, and I(.) is a 
Lorentz-consistent  inequality  measure  such  as  the  Gini  coefficient  or  the  Theil  index.  A 
positive/negative value of ε  indicate that average incomes, a , are more/less equally distributed 
than the base-year incomes,  yl, and a 0 value that a  and  ylare distributed equally unequally.  
Applying this measure to the hypothetical situations introduced above, results in a value of -
3.9·10
-3 for the “Gates-gains” and of +6.6·10
-3 for the “Gates-loses”, suggesting that the “Gates-
loses” process is equalizing and “Gates-gains” is disequalizing. (Fields, 2008) For a complete 
description of the properties of the Fields index please refer to Fields (2008). 11 
 
By applying these two indices, we first assess the degree of long-term earnings mobility across 
14 EU countries, and second we establish whether this mobility is equalizing or disequalizing 
long-term earnings differentials. We chose to work with the mobility index based on the Theil 
index, but the other indices can be provided upon request from the authors. 
4.  DATA 
The study uses the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
4 over the period 1994-2001 
for 14 EU countries. Not all countries are present for all waves. Luxembourg and Austria are 
observed over a period of 7 waves (1995-2001) and Finland over a period of 6 waves (1996-
2001). Following the tradition of previous studies, the analysis focuses only on men.  
A  special  problem  with  panel  data  is  that  of  attrition  over  time,  as  individuals  are  lost  at 
successive  dates  causing  the  panel  to  decline  in  size  and  raising  the  problem  of 
representativeness. Several papers analysed the extent and the determinants of panel attrition in 
ECHP. A. Behr, E. Bellgardt, U. Rendtel (2005) found that the extent and the determinants of 
panel attrition vary between countries and across waves within one country, but these differences 
do not bias the analysis of income or the ranking of the national results. L.Ayala, C. Navrro, 
M.Sastre (2006) assessed the effects of panel attrition on income mobility comparisons for some 
EU countries from ECHP. The results show that ECHP attrition is characterized by a certain 
degree  of  selectivity,  but  only  affecting  some  variables  and  some  countries.  Moreover,  the 
income mobility indicators show certain sensitivity to the weighting system.  
In  this  paper,  the  weighting  system  applied  to  correct  for  the  attrition  bias  is  the  one 
recommended by Eurostat, namely using the “base weights” of the last wave observed for each 
individual, bounded between 0.25 and 10. The dataset is scaled up to a multiplicative constant
5 
of the base weights of the last year observed for each individual. 
For this study we use real net
6 hourly wage adjusted for CPI of male workers aged 20 to 57, born 
between 1940 and 1981. Only observations with hourly wage lower than 50 Euros and higher 
                                                              
4 The European Community Household Panel provided by Eurostat via the Department of Applied Economics at the 
Université Libre de Bruxelles. 
5 The multiplicative constant equals p*(Population above 16/Sample Population). The ratio p varies across countries 
so that sensible samples are obtained. It ranges between 0.001-0.01. 
6 Except for France, where wage is in gross amounts 12 
 
than  1  Euro  were  considered  in  the  analysis.  The  resulting  sample  for  each  country  is  an 
unbalanced panel. Details on the number of observations, inflows and outflows of the sample by 
cohort over time for each country are provided in Table 1.  
5.  CHANGES IN EARNINGS INEQUALITY 
Before exploring earnings mobility at the EU level, as a first step we describe the evolution of 
the earnings distribution both over time and across different time horizons.  
5.1.Changes in the cross-section earnings distribution over time 
This section presents the changing shape of the cross-sectional distribution of earnings for men 
over time. Figure 1 illustrates the frequency density estimates for the first wave
7, 1998 and 2001 
earnings distributions and Table 2 illustrates the evolution of the other moments of the earnings 
distribution over time. The evolution of mean net hourly wage shows that men in most countries 
got richer over time, except for Austria. Net hourly earnings became more dispersed in most 
countries, except Austria, France and Denmark.  
Plotting the percentage change in mean hourly earnings between the beginning of the sample 
period and 2001 at each point of the distribution for each country (Figure 2), revealed that, in 
most countries, the relationship between the quantile
8 rank and the growth in real earnings is 
negative and nearly monotonic: the higher the rank, the smaller the increase in earnings. This 
shows that in most countries, over time, the situation of the low paid people improved to a larger 
extent than for the better off ones. In Austria, people at the top of the distribution experienced a 
decrease in mean hourly wage over time, which might explain the decrease in the overall mean. 
Netherlands, Germany, Greece and Finland diverge in their pattern from the other EU countries 
experiencing a higher relative increase in earnings the higher the rank. Netherlands is the only 
country where men at the bottom of the income distribution recorded a deterioration of their 
work pay. For these countries, the increase in the overall mean might be the result of an increase 
in the earnings position of the better off individuals, not the low paid ones. 
                                                              
7 For Luxembourg and Austria, the first wave was recorded in 1995, whereas for Finland in 1996.  
8 100 Quantiles 13 
 
To complete the descriptive picture of the cross-sectional earnings distribution over time, we 
provide also inequality measures. Inequality indices differ with respect to their sensitivity to 
income differences in different parts of the distribution. Therefore they illustrate different sides 
of the earnings distribution. The  year-to-year changes  in earnings  inequality are captured by 
computing the ratio between the mean earnings in the 9th decile and the 1st decile (Figure 3), the 
Gini  index,  the  GE  indices  -  the  Theil  Index  (GE(1))  -,  and  the  Atkinson  inequality  index 
evaluated at an the aversion parameter equal to 1 (Table 3).
9  
The ratio between the mean earnings in the 9th decile and the 1st deciles focuses only on the two 
ends of the distribution. The Gini index is most sensitive to income differences in the middle of 
the distribution (more precisely, the mode). The GE with a negative parameter is sensitive to 
income  differences  at  the  bottom  of  the  distribution  and  the  sensitivity  increases  the  more 
negative the parameter is. The GE with a positive parameter is sensitive to income differences at 
the top of the distribution and it becomes more sensitive the more positive the parameter is. For 
the Atkinson inequality indices, the more positive the “inequality aversion parameter” is, the 
more sensitive the index is to income differences at the bottom of the distribution. 
The level and pattern of inequality over time as measured by the ratio between the mean earnings 
in the 9th decile and the 1st decile differs to a large extent between the EU14 countries. Two 
clusters can be identified. The first one is comprised of Netherlands, Begium, Italy, Finland, 
Austria and Denmark and is characterized by a small relative distance between the bottom and 
top of the distribution. The other cluster identifies countries with a higher level of inequality, 
with ratios between 2.75 and 4.  
In 1994, based on the Gini  index, Portugal  is the  most unequal,  followed by Spain,  France, 
Ireland, UK, Greece, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Denmark. In general, the other 
two indices confirm this ranking. However, using the Theil index, France appears to be more 
unequal than Spain, whereas using the Atkinson index, Ireland appears to be more unequal than 
France and as equal as Spain.  
                                                              
9 Besides these indices, several others were computed (GE(-1); GE(0), GE(2), Atkinson evaluated at different values 
of the aversion parameter) and can be provided upon request from the authors. They support the findings shown by 
the reported indices.  14 
 
In 2001, based on the Gini index, Portugal is still the most unequal, followed by France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Spain, UK, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Italy, Finland, Belgium, Austria and 
Denmark.  In  general,  the  other two  indices  confirm  this  ranking.  Based  on  Theil,  however, 
Greece  is  more  unequal  than  France,  and  Spain  than  Luxembourg.  Based  on  Atkinson, 
Luxembourg is more unequal than Greece.  
For most countries, all indices show a consistent story regarding the evolution of inequality over 
the sample period, except for Germany, France and Portugal, where the evolution of the Gini, 
Theil and Atkinson index is opposite to the one observed for the D9/D1. Based on Gini, Theil 
and Atkinson, Netherlands, Greece, Finland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Italy and Germany recorded 
an increase in yearly inequality, and the rest a decrease. The trends for Denmark, UK, Spain and 
Germany are consistent with Gregg and Vittori (2008). 
The relative evolution over the sample period is captured in Figure 4, which illustrates for each 
country, the change in inequality as measured by Gini, Theil, Atkinson index and the D9/D1. 
Based on Gini, the highest increase in inequality was recorded by Netherlands (around 15%), 
followed by Greece, Finland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Italy and Germany. The highest decrease 
was recorded in Ireland (around 20%), followed by Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, France 
and UK. Based on the Theil index, Portugal records a higher increase than Finland, Italy a higher 
increase than Luxembourg and Spain a higher decrease than Belgium. Based on Atkinson index, 
Portugal records a higher increase than Finland, and UK a higher decrease than France.  
For Netherlands, Finland and Greece the increase in the distance between the top and bottom of 
the distribution and in the overall level of inequality can be explained by the improved earnings 
position of the better off individuals. Hence in these countries, the economic growth benefitted 
the high income people and leaded to an increase in earnings inequality.  
Luxembourg and Italy recorded an increase in inequality based on all indices, but the situation at 
the bottom improved to a larger extent than for the top. Thus the increase in inequality might be 
the  result  of  other  forces  affecting  the  distribution,  such  as  mobility  in  the  bottom  and  top 
deciles. 
For France, the relative distance between the top and the bottom 10% appears to increase over 
time, in spite of a higher relative increase in mean earnings at the bottom of the distribution 
compared with the top. This discrepancy could be explained by the presence of earnings mobility 15 
 
in the bottom and top 10% of the earnings distribution. The improved conditions for people in 
the bottom of the distributions could explain the decrease in earnings inequality as displayed by 
the other three indices. 
Germany  records  opposite  trends  from  France:  the  situation  of  the  better  off  individuals 
improved to a larger extent than for low paid ones, which explains the increase in the overall 
inequality  as  captured  by  the  Gini,  Theil  and  Atkinson  indices.  The  evolution  of  the  ratio 
between mean earnings at the top and the bottom deciles is opposite to what was expected: the 
decrease might suggest that there are other forces at work, such as mobility in the top part of the 
distribution, which determined mean earnings to decrease for this group.  
Portugal records similar trends with Germany, except for the negative correlation between the 
rank  in  the  earnings  distribution  and  the  growth  in  earnings.  Thus,  the  fact  that  low  paid 
individuals improved their earnings position to a higher extent relative to high paid individuals, 
lowering the distance between the bottom and the top deciles of the earnings distribution did not 
have the expected effect of lowering overall earnings inequality as measured by the Gini, Theil 
and Atkinson indices. Mobility is expected to be the factor counteracting all these movements.  
For the rest of the countries, the increase in the overall mean, coupled with the higher relative 
increase  in  the  earnings  position  of  the  low  paid  individuals  compared  with  high  earnings 
individuals can be an explanation for their decrease in inequality.  
Besides the direction of evolution, also the magnitude of the change records differences among 
inequality indices. In general, the magnitude of the change is the highest for the index that is 
most sensitive to the income differences at the top of the distribution, followed by bottom and 
middle sensitive one, sign that most of the major changes happened at the top and the bottom of 
the distribution. There are a few exceptions. In UK, Spain, Belgium and Denmark the magnitude 
of the evolution is the highest for the bottom sensitive one, followed by the top and middle ones.  
5.2.Changes in the earnings distribution over the lifecycle: short versus long-term income 
inequality 
Finally we complete the earnings distribution picture with the evolution of earnings inequality 
when we extend the horizon over which inequality is measured. We consider both the balanced 16 
 
and the unbalanced approach. We report only the results for the Theil index. The results on the 
other inequality indices can be provided upon request from the authors. 
Table 4 and Table 5 illustrate the evolution of inequality at different time horizons for all EU14 
countries using a balanced and unbalanced sample. Inequality measures based on the unbalanced 
approach are higher than those based on the balanced approach. This is not surprising given that 
people which work over the entire sample are expected to have more stable jobs, and thus lower 
earnings differentials as opposed to the case when we include also those with instable jobs.  
As expected, as time horizon increases, inequality reduces in all countries, except Portugal under 
the balanced approach.
10 The rate of change in inequality as the time horizon increases differs 
across countries. As proof, Figure 5 (Panel A - balanced approach and Panel B – unbalanced 
approach) shows the short and long-term earnings inequality (left) and their relative difference 
(right). Short–term refers to inequality in average earnings measured over two years, meaning in 
the first and the second wave, and long-term refers to inequality in average earnings measured 
over the sample period. 
The  ranking  in  inequality  when  the  horizon  is  extended  from  one  to  two  years  is  roughly 
maintained  and  this  is  consistent  across  both  approaches.  Short-term  Denmark  is  the  least 
unequal and Portugal the  most unequal. A difference  in  short-term ranking between the two 
approaches  is  observed  for  Greece,  which  is  more  unequal  than  Denmark,  Finland,  Austria, 
Belgium, Netherland, Italy, Germany, UK, and Luxembourg in the balanced approach and more 
unequal than the former 7 countries in the unbalanced approach. Similarly, Spain is less unequal 
than Ireland and Portugal under the balanced approach, and less unequal than Portugal under the 
unbalanced approach. Thus short-term differential attrition affects Greece and Spain the most. 
More shuffling occurs as the horizon is extended to the sample period.  
The  relative  difference  between  short  and  long-term  inequality  displayed  in  Figure  5  (right) 
provide a first clue regarding the degree to which each country manages to reduce long-term 
earnings differentials compared  with  short-term  ones. If  inequality  measured over the whole 
sample period can be considered as a proxy for lifetime earnings inequality or inequality in the 
permanent component of earnings, the rate of decrease with the time horizon can be interpreted 
as a reduction in the transitory earnings inequality over the lifetime or the fading off of the 
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transitory component of earnings. Some countries manage to reduce inequality over the lifetime 
at a higher extent than others.  
Based on the balanced approach (Figure 5 – Panel A) Ireland and Denmark display the highest 
reduction in long-term earnings inequality as the time horizon increases (over 30%), followed by 
Austria (over 15%), France and UK (over 10%), and the rest below 9%. Portugal is the only one 
recoding an increase in long-term inequality relative to short-term (over 6%). Based on these 
trends, we expect Ireland and Denmark to have the highest equalizing mobility over the lifecycle, 
Italy and Spain the lowest, and Portugal to have a disequalizing mobility.  
The  relative  difference  between  long-term  and  short-run  inequality  is  lower  in  the  balanced 
(Figure 5 – Panel A) compared with the unbalanced approach (Figure 5 – Panel B), showing that 
differential attrition affects all countries. The explanation is that looking only at people that work 
over  the  entire  sample  period  might  overestimate  the  degree  of  earnings  persistency  and 
underestimate the degree of earnings instability.  
Comparing between the two approaches, the most drastic difference is observed for Portugal, 
where  also  the  direction  of  change  differs,  indicating  an  increase  in  long-term  differentials 
relative  to  short-term  ones.  Also  the  ranking  in  the  relative  changes  differs  under  the  two 
approaches. Under the unbalanced approach, Portugal still records the lowest rank, and Ireland, 
Denmark and Austria the highest. For the rest the ranks are shuffled. UK, Luxembourg and Spain 
jump towards higher positions, after Ireland, Denmark and Austria. The rest lower their rank. 
Thus except for the extremes, differential attrition plays a significant role in country ranking with 
respect to the degree to which earnings differentials are reduced with the time horizon.  
The countries with the highest reduction in long-term inequality relative to short-term inequality 
(over 20%) in the unbalanced approach (Figure 5 – Panel B) are observed to be also the ones 
which record a decrease in inequality
11 over time, except Luxembourg. Hence, on the one hand 
one might expect that the reduction in the transitory earnings inequality is one of the factors 
determining the decrease in the overall inequality over time. This might indicate the presence of 
a  shock  in  the  beginning  of  the  sample  period  that  influenced  the  temporary  component  of 
earnings and whose impact faded off over time. One the other hand, it might indicate that people 
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became more mobile, improved their income position in the long run and reduced permanent 
income differentials. The outcome depends mainly on the evolution of mobility over time.  
Under the balanced approach, the situation is confirmed for the countries with decreasing cross-
sectional inequality, except for Spain and Belgium, which record among the smallest decreases 
in  long-term  inequality  relative  to  short-term  inequality.  Thus  among  the  countries  with 
decreasing cross-sectional  inequality,  based on the differences  between the balanced and the 
unbalanced approach, Spain and Belgium appear to be the most affected by differential attrition. 
Based on the balanced approach, for countries that recorded an increase in the overall inequality 
over  the  sample  period,  the  small  decrease  in  inequality  with  the  time  horizon,  signals  the 
presence of strong permanent earnings differences between individuals or the existence of some 
shocks with permanent effects, whose inequality is accentuated by the inequality in the transitory 
component of earnings. Moreover, the  magnitude of the transitory component of earnings  is 
expected to be lower for these countries. Except for Luxembourg which records a high decrease 
in inequality with the time horizon, the unbalanced approach reveals a similar picture. 
Under the unbalanced approach, in Luxembourg, the increase in the overall inequality over the 
sample period coupled with the high decrease in inequality with the time horizon signals the 
presence of some transitory shocks, which fade away in the long run. The difference in the two 
approached indicate that the attrition incidence is higher in Luxembourg compared with the other 
countries where cross-sectional inequality increased.  
To  conclude,  even  based  on  average  earnings  over  the  whole  sample  period,  a  substantial 
inequality in the permanent component of earnings is still present in all countries under analysis. 
The  lowest  long-term  inequality,  meaning  the  lowest  inequality  in  permanent  earnings,  is 
recorded  in  Denmark,  followed  by  Finland,  Austria,  Belgium  and  Netherlands  with  similar 
values,  then  Italy,  Germany,  UK,  Luxembourg,  Greece,  Ireland,  France  and  Spain.  Portugal 
differentiates  itself  with  a  particularly  high  long-term  inequality  compared  with  the  other 
countries. (Figure 5) 19 
 
6.  THE MOBILITY PROFILE 
What are the possible implications in a lifetime perspective? To answer this question we need to 
couple  the  information  on  the  evolution  of  inequality  with  earnings  mobility.  Is  there  any 
earnings mobility in a lifetime perspective, meaning are the relative income positions observed 
on an annual basis shuffled long-term? If yes, is mobility equalizing or disequalizing lifetime 
earnings  differentials  compared  with  annual  earnings  differentials?  We  report  the  mobility 
indices based on the Theil index. The ones based on the other inequality indices can be provided 
upon request from the authors. 
6.1.Stability Profile - Shorrocks 
To answer the first question we look at the stability profile, both under the balanced and the 
unbalanced  approach,  illustrated  in  Figure  6  and  Figure  7.  Both  figures  contain  the  same 
information, organized differently for the ease of the interpretation. To recall, the stability profile 
plots the Shorrocks rigidity index
12 across different time horizons. In Figure 6 and Figure 7 the 
time horizons are expressed in reference to the 1
st wave for each country. The stability profile 
allows the visual identification of the presence of permanent and transitory earnings components.  
All countries record similar trends: the rigidity declines monotonically as the time horizon is 
extended  (Figure  6  and  Figure  7).  Moreover,  the  longer  the  time-horizon  is,  the  more 
heterogeneous the stability profiles  become. The story  is confirmed  by  both approaches.  As 
illustrated in Figure 6, the profiles under the two approaches evolve close to one another sign 
that the impact of attrition is limited. Some countries are affected to a larger extent by attrition 
than others. A larger impact is identified in Luxembourg, France, Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Austria, which have a higher differentiation between the two profiles. For Luxembourg, Spain 
and Austria the rigidity index under the unbalanced approach is higher than in the balanced 
approach for horizons 1 to 4, suggesting that including also those individuals that move in and 
out of employment results in a higher degree of earnings rigidity. The opposite is observed in 
Ireland, Greece and France, suggesting that more income rigidity is observed among those that 
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worked for the whole sample than including also those that moved in and out of paid work over 
the sample period.  
Based on the stability profiles in Figure 6 and Figure 7, we make inferences concerning the 
source of mobility in each country. Based on the overall pattern of the profiles, we identify two 
country clusters, confirmed under both approaches, illustrated in Figure 7. Overall, the stability 
profiles on the right side of Figure 7 are steeper than on the left side, suggesting that income 
changes in Denmark, Finland, Austria, UK, Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Netherlands are due to 
transitory effects to a larger extent than in the other countries. Hence we can expect a higher 
lifetime mobility in the former.  
Among the countries with less steep profiles, we identify countries where the profile (both the 
balanced and the unbalanced one) drops sharply  in the  beginning  and then tends to become 
horizontal after a few years, suggesting that the income changes are purely due to transitory 
effects which average out over time. (Figure 6) Thus relative incomes approach rapidly their 
permanent values and there is no further equalization. It is the case of France. A similar trend 
(consistent across the two approaches) is observed in Portugal, except the last drop in the 8-year 
period rigidity
13 which signals the presence of mobility in the permanent earnings for horizons 
equal and longer than 8 years. (Figure 6) 
In Germany and Spain, the “balanced” and the “unbalanced” profiles communicate a consistent 
story for the rigidity over a horizon shorter than 3-4 years and a slightly different picture for 
longer horizons. (Figure 6) For a horizon shorter than 4 years the two profiles both record a sharp 
decreasing  slope,  signalling  income  changes  due  to  transitory  effects.  Spain  has  a  sharper 
decrease, suggesting more transitory changes than Germany for horizons shorter or equal to 4 
years.  For  a  horizon  longer  than  4  years,  the  two  profiles  communicate  a  slightly  different 
picture.  In  Germany  the  unbalanced  profile  becomes  flat  between  the  4  and  5-year  period 
mobility, suggesting that the income changes are due to transitory effects. Thereafter it decreases 
suggesting the presence of mobility in the permanent component at longer horizons. The same 
trend is observed in Spain, except that the flattening of the unbalanced profile occurs between a 
span of 4 to 5 years. The decrease observed in the unbalanced profiles at longer aggregation 
periods signals the presence of mobility in the permanent component. 
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Based on the  balanced  approach (Figure 6), in  Germany and Spain, the profiles continue to 
decrease  as  the  aggregation  period  is  extended,  suggesting  more  mobility  in  the  permanent 
component than observed in the unbalanced approach. Thus considering also the people that 
move in and out of paid work over the sample period decreases the degree of mobility observed 
in the permanent component. This is expected, given that those that keep their jobs over the 
sample period are expected to be also the ones with higher opportunities of improving their 
relative position in the distribution of lifetime income.  
As illustrated in Figure 6, the other two countries from the first cluster identified in Figure 7 
(Luxembourg and Italy) record a sharp decrease over a horizon of two years, followed by curves 
which decrease at a decreasing rate, in a convergent trend towards a horizontal profile. Given 
that in Luxembourg and Italy the rigidity curve continues to decline as the aggregation period is 
extended, suggest that income changes in these countries are due to more mobility in permanent 
incomes. These trends are confirmed by both approaches. 
The overall rank in the stability profiles between the countries with less steep profiles differs 
slightly based on the horizon and the approach. Under the balanced approach (Figure 7), Panel 
A), the stability profile is the highest in Portugal, followed by Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, 
Italy and France, except for a horizon longer than 4 years when the rigidity is higher in France 
than in Italy, and in Luxembourg than in Germany. Under the unbalanced approach (Figure 7), 
Panel B), the ranking in the stability profile is similar. Two exceptions are present: the rigidity is 
higher in Luxembourg than in Germany for all horizons, and in France than in Italy for a horizon 
longer than 5 year. 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the countries with the steepest profiles – the right country cluster in 
Figure  7  –  record  a  sharp  decrease  over  a  horizon  of  two  years,  followed  by  curves  which 
continue to decline as the aggregation period is extended, suggesting that income changes in 
these countries are due to more mobility in permanent incomes. The curves under the balanced 
and unbalanced approach communicate a similar story in most countries. Some differences are 
observed for Belgium and Greece for longer horizons. In Belgium, a differentiation between the 
two  profiles  occurs  between  a  7  and  8-year  horizon,  when  the  unbalanced  profile  becomes 
horizontal, whereas the balanced one keeps declining. In Greece, the unbalanced profile becomes 22 
 
horizontal  between  the  5  and  6-year  horizon  and  decreases  thereafter,  whereas  the  balanced 
profile continues to decline with the horizon.  
The overall rank in the rigidity profiles between the countries with the steepest profiles – right 
country cluster in Figure 7 - differs based on the horizon and the approach used to a larger extent 
compared with the countries with less steep profiles – left country cluster in Figure 7. 
Under the balanced approach (Figure 7, Panel A), the steepest profile over a 2-year horizon is 
recorded in Austria and Greece, followed by a cluster with similar vales, then UK, Netherlands, 
and finally Ireland. Over a 3-year horizon the ranks are slightly shuffled: Austria, Denmark and 
Finland have the lowest rigidity, followed by a cluster formed of UK, Belgium, and Greece, then 
Ireland and Netherlands with similar values. After the 3-year horizon, the profile for Austria 
becomes  less  steep,  crossing  the  profiles  of  Denmark  and  Finland,  which  record the  lowest 
rigidity  thereafter.  At  higher  levels  of  rigidity  we  observe  the  profiles  for  Greece,  UK  and 
Belgium, which evolve together, followed by the profiles of Netherlands and Ireland.  
The  unbalanced  approach  (Figure  7,  Panel  A)  reveals  a  higher  differentiation  between  the 
profiles at shorter horizons and a higher degree of convergence at longer horizons. Over a 2-year 
horizon, the  lowest rigidity  is recorded  in Greece,  followed  by a  cluster formed of  Finland, 
Denmark,  Austria  and  Belgium,  then  UK,  and  finally  Ireland  and  Netherlands  with  similar 
values. The profiles become more heterogenous at longer profiles. The lowest profile is observed 
in Denmark, followed by Finland, Austria, then a cluster formed by Greece, UK and Belgium, 
then  Ireland  and  finally  Netherlands.  Over  an  8-year  horizon,  Denmark  stands  out  with  the 
lowest rigidity, whereas a convergence is observed for the rest
14.  
We  conclude  this  section  with  an  overview  of  the  long-period  Shorrocks  mobility  country 
ranking.  
All these trends lead to a change in long-period mobility ranking as the horizon is extended. In 
the beginning of the sample period, under the balanced approach, over a horizon of 2 years, the 
lowest  mobility  is recorded  in Portugal,  followed by Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, Spain, 
Italy,  Netherlands,  UK,  France,  Denmark,  Finland,  Belgium,  Greece  and  Austria.  Under  the 
unbalanced  approach,  the  ranking  changes  slightly:  Portugal,  Luxembourg,  Germany,  Spain, 
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Ireland, Netherlands, Italy, UK, Belgium, France, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Greece. The 
largest jumps in ranking are observed in Austria and Belgium. More shuffling occurs as the 
period over which mobility is measured is extended. (Table 6 and Table 7) 
Following these changes, the ranking in long-term earnings Shorrocks mobility is revealed in 
Figure 8. Based on the balanced approach, the highest mobility over a horizon of 6 years is 
recorded  in  Denmark  and  Finland,  followed  by  Austria,  Belgium,  UK,  Greece,  Ireland, 
Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal. Denmark and Finland 
record the lowest annual inequality, and Portugal the highest annual inequality. Thus we can 
expect,  among  the  selected  countries,  Denmark  and  Finland  to  trigger  the  lowest  lifetime 
inequality  and  Portugal  the  highest.  The  country  ranking  is  confirmed  by  the  unbalanced 
approach, except Netherlands which, under the unbalanced approach, has a lower mobility than 
Italy. 
Based on the balanced approach, over a horizon of 7 years the ranking is in general preserved: 
Denmark and Austria record the highest mobility, and Portugal and Luxembourg the lowest. One 
exception is UK which scores a higher rank than Belgium. Austria has the 5
th lowest annual 
inequality  and  Luxembourg  the  9
th.  Thus  we  expect  Austria  to  reduce  lifetime  earnings 
differential compared with annual differentials to a higher extent than Portugal and Luxembourg, 
and to a lesser extent than Denmark. This results is consistent with Hofer and Weber (2002). 
Similarly, we expect Luxembourg to reduce lifetime differentials to a higher extent than Portugal 
and to a lesser extent than Denmark. The ranking is confirmed by the unbalanced approach, 
except for the UK which ranks lower than Belgium. 
Finally, over an eight-year horizon
15, the ranking is in general preserved. The highest mobility is 
recorded in Denmark, followed by UK, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Italy, France, 
Spain, Germany, and the lowest, Portugal. Therefore Denmark provides the highest opportunity 
of  reducing  lifetime  earnings  differentials  and  Portugal  the  lowest.  The  ranking  between 
Denmark, UK, Spain and Germany is consistent with the one found by Gregg and Vittori (2008) 
using the Shorrocks index based on all indices considered, including Theil and Gini.  
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To sum up, all countries record an increase in earnings mobility when the horizon over which 
mobility is measured is extended. This shows that men do have an increasing mobility in the 
distribution of lifetime earnings as they advance in their career. This result is confirmed both by 
the balanced and the unbalanced approach. The differential attrition appears to have a limited 
impact on the stability profiles, but a higher impact on the country ranking which decreases with 
the horizon over which mobility is measured.  
But is this mobility equalizing or disequalizing lifetime earnings differentials?  
6.2.Mobility Profile – as equalizer on long-term earnings inequality 
Next  we  introduce  the  mobility  profile  based  on  the  Fields  index,  which  unlike  Shorrocks 
captures whether mobility is equalizing or disequalizing long-term differentials. (Figure 9 and 
Figure 10) Overall, mobility increases with the horizon for all countries, except Portugal. The 
evolution,  however,  is  not monotonic  for all countries. Except Portugal, all countries record 
positive values of mobility, showing that mobility is equalizing earnings differentials long-term. 
The story is confirmed by both approaches. For Portugal, mobility turns negative when measured 
over an 8-year horizon, showing that mobility is exacerbating long-term earning differentials. 
We conclude that all countries, except Portugal, manage to reduce earnings differentials in a 
lifetime perspective.  
Comparing between Figure 9 and Figure 6 reveals that the Fields index is affected to a larger 
extent by differential attrition than the Shorrocks index: the differentiation between the mobility 
profile under the balanced approach and the one under the unbalanced approach is evident in all 
countries,  in  some  more  than  in  others.  The  largest  differences  between  the  two  curves  are 
observed in Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Finland.  
The  mobility ratio  for the balanced approach  is higher than  for the unbalanced approach  in 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Finland, suggesting that including also the people that moved into 
and out of employment and those that entered and exited the sample leads to higher levels of 
mobility as equalizer of long-term differentials. The reverse is observed in France, UK, Portugal 
and Ireland (except for the 7-year horizon). We tried to relate back to Table 1 to identify the 
possible driving factors in these results, but the patterns in the inflows and outflows in the data 
do not reveal any distinctive pattern.  25 
 
For the rest the results are mixed. In Germany, Denmark, Greece and Austria, the mobility under 
the unbalanced approach is higher than under the balanced approach for shorter horizons and 
lower for longer horizons. In Spain the “unbalanced” mobility is lower until the 4-year horizon 
and similar with the “balanced” mobility thereafter. Possible explanations for the trends in the 
mobility profile in the two approaches can be found in Table 1. In Germany, Denmark, Greece 
and Austria, the “unbalanced” mobility becomes lower than the balanced one in 1998, 1998, 
1998 and 1999 (Figure 9), which is the year when the attrition rates increase, and the share and 
the number of individuals with positive earnings in 1998 from those that were present in the 
sample in 1997 decrease compared with the previous years. For example, in Germany, 9.06% of 
the people who were in the sample in 1997 disappeared in 1998, which is almost twice the rate 
observed one year before (5.18%). From those that were present in the sample in 1997, only 
63.01% record positive earnings in 1998, as compared to 66.2% in the previous year (Table 1) 
Four clusters are identified in the evolution of long-term mobility profiles, confirmed both by the 
balanced and the unbalanced approach. (Figure 10) Independent of the horizon, Portugal and 
Italy have the lowest profiles, indicating that they have the lowest mobility as equalizer of long 
term differentials. The ranking for the other countries changes to a large extent for horizons up to 
4 years. Looking after the 4
th horizon, three clusters are observed. The first cluster, with values 
higher than Portugal and Italy, is formed by Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg 
and Finland. This is followed by a cluster formed by UK, Belgium, France and Austria. Finally, 
Denmark and Ireland stand out with respect to the steepness of their profiles and to the high level 
of their long-term mobility.  
Some convergence trends emerge as the horizon over which mobility is measured increases. For 
a horizon of 7-8 years, mobility converges to similar values in Denmark and Ireland, in Belgium 
and France, in Spain and Germany, and in Luxembourg, Greece and Netherlands. (Figure 10) 
We conclude this section with an overview of the country ranking in Fields mobility. Similar 
with the trend observed for the Shorrocks index, the country ranking changes with the horizon 
over which mobility is measured.  
Based on the balanced approach, the 2-year mobility is the highest in Belgium, followed by 
Denmark, France, Greece, Austria, Luxembourg, UK, Finland, Spain, Ireland, Netherlands, Italy, 
Germany and Portugal. The unbalanced approach reveals a slightly different picture than the 26 
 
balanced one, sign that the Fields index is more sensitive to differential attrition compared with 
the  Shorrocks  index  where  the  rankings  are  similar  between  the  two  approaches.  Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Austria still have the highest mobility, and Germany and Portugal the 
lowest. In between, in a descendent order we find Ireland, UK, Finland, Italy, Spain, Netherlands 
and Luxembourg. 
Figure 11 displays the ranking in long-term Fields mobility. Based on the balanced approach 
(Panel A), over a horizon of 6 years, Denmark, Ireland and Austria record the highest mobility, 
followed  by  Belgium,  France,  UK,  Finland,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Greece,  Italy,  Spain 
Germany and Portugal. Thus except for Portugal, the mobility picture over the 6-year horizon 
looks different from the one over the 2-year horizon. Based on the unbalanced approach (Panel 
B),  Ireland  has  the  highest  mobility,  followed  by  Denmark,  Austria,  France,  Belgium,  UK, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Greece, Germany and Portugal.  
Over a 7-year horizon, the balanced approach reveals the same ranking as over a 6-year horizon 
for the first 6 countries and Portugal. In between, in a descending order, we find Netherlands, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy and Spain. Based on the unbalanced approach, the first 3 
countries maintain the ranks from the balanced approach, followed by Belgium, France, UK, 
Netherlands,  Greece  and  Luxembourg  with  similar  values,  then  Germany,  Italy,  Spain  and 
Portugal. 
Finally, over a horizon of 8 years, the highest mobility is recorded in Ireland and Denmark, 
followed by France and Belgium with similar values, then UK, Greece, Netherlands, Germany, 
Spain, Italy, and Portugal with a negative value. Thus, assuming that the 8-year mobility is a 
good  approximation  of  lifetime  mobility,  Ireland  and  Denmark  have  the  highest  equalizing 
mobility in a lifetime perspective, and Italy, Spain and Germany the lowest. Portugal is the only 
country where mobility acts as a disequalizer of lifetime differentials. 
The overall information revealed by the two indices is summarized in Figure 12, Figure 13 and 
Table 10. Comparing the rankings in 6, 8, 7-year mobility between the Shorrocks and the Fields 
index the mobility pictures differ to a certain extent.  
Based on the 8-year mobility (Figure 13 and Table 10), Portugal records the lowest values based 
on both indices. Lifetime mobility is present in Portugal, but is disequalizing, thus it does not 
benefit low earnings individuals. 27 
 
Among the countries with the highest 5 values in lifetime Shorrocks mobility – Denmark, UK, 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland - only Denmark, Ireland, Belgium and UK score among the 5 highest 
in  the  Fields  lifetime  equalizing  mobility,  suggesting  that  these  countries  have  the  highest 
lifetime mobility with the highest equalizing impact on lifetime earnings differentials. Denmark 
scores  the  highest  in  lifetime  mobility,  but  the  second  highest  after  Ireland  in  equalizing 
mobility, suggesting that mobility in Ireland is slightly more equalizing in a lifetime perspective 
than in Denmark. Compared with the other countries, Denmark has a higher lifetime mobility 
with a higher lifetime equalizing impact. 
UK has a lower lifetime mobility and a lower equalizing impact than Denmark. Compared with 
Ireland, Belgium and France, UK has a higher lifetime mobility, but with a lower equalizing 
impact.  A  possible  explanation  is  that  UK  has  a  higher  share  of  lifetime  mobility  which  is 
disequalizing than Ireland, Belgium and France. Compared with the remaining countries, UK has 
a higher lifetime mobility with a higher lifetime equalizing impact. 
Belgium scores the third highest after Denmark and UK based on Shorrocks and the 4th highest 
after Ireland, Denmark, and France based on Fields. Thus Belgium has a lower lifetime mobility 
with a lower equalizing impact than Denmark, a higher lifetime mobility and a lower equalizing 
mobility than Ireland and France, and a lower lifetime mobility but with a higher equalizing 
impact  than  in  UK.  Compared  with  the  remaining  countries  Belgium  has  a  higher  lifetime 
mobility with a higher lifetime equalizing impact. 
Greece has a higher lifetime mobility with a higher equalizing impact than Netherlands, Italy, 
Germany, Spain and Portugal. Compared with Denmark, Belgium and UK, Greece has a lower 
lifetime mobility and a lower equalizing mobility. Compared with Ireland and France, Greece 
has a higher lifetime mobility and a lower equalizing impact, signalling that a lower part of the 
mobility  in  Greece  is  equalizing  lifetime  earnings  differentials  compared  with  Ireland  and 
France.  
Ireland  has  a  higher  lifetime  mobility  than  Netherlands,  Italy,  France,  Spain,  Germany  and 
Portugal, and a lower lifetime mobility than the other countries. In terms of equalizing impact, 
however, Ireland is the strongest. 
Netherlands has a middle rank both in lifetime mobility and in lifetime equalizing mobility. It 
has a higher lifetime mobility and a higher equalizing impact than Germany, Spain, Italy and 28 
 
Portugal. Compared to France it has a higher lifetime mobility, but a lower equalizing mobility, 
sign that a higher share of mobility is disequalizing in the Netherlands. 
Italy has a lower lifetime mobility with a lower equalizing impact compared with most countries, 
except Portugal, for which the opposite holds, and Germany, Spain, and France, which have a 
lower lifetime mobility and a higher equalizing mobility. 
France has a higher lifetime mobility and a higher equalizing mobility than Spain, Germany and 
Portugal, and a lower lifetime inequality coupled with a lower equalizing mobility than Denmark 
and Ireland. Compared with the rest, France has a lower lifetime inequality but with a higher 
equalizing impact.  
Spain has a higher lifetime mobility with a higher equalizing impact than Portugal, a higher 
lifetime mobility and a lower equalizing mobility than Germany and the reverse compared with 
Italy. Compared with the remaining countries, Spain has a lower lifetime mobility with a lower 
equalizing impact.  
Germany has a higher lifetime mobility with a higher equalizing impact than Portugal, a lower 
lifetime  mobility  and a  higher equalizing  mobility than Spain and Italy. Compared  with the 
remaining countries, Germany has a lower lifetime mobility with a lower equalizing impact. 
Based on the 7-year mobility (Figure 12 and Table 10), Austria has a higher lifetime mobility 
with a higher equalizing impact than most countries, except Denmark where the reverse holds, 
and Ireland which has a higher equalizing mobility. This is confirmed under both approaches. 
Using the same  horizon as Austria, Luxembourg has a  lower  lifetime  mobility with a  lower 
equalizing impact than most countries, except Portugal, where the reverse holds, and Germany, 
Spain and Italy, which have a higher lifetime mobility but with a lower equalizing impact.  
Based on the 6-year mobility (Figure 12 and Table 10), Finland has a higher lifetime mobility 
with a higher equalizing impact than Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
and Portugal, a lower lifetime mobility with a lower equalizing impact than Denmark, and a 
higher lifetime mobility but with a lower equalizing mobility than Belgium, France, UK, Ireland 
and Austria.  29 
 
6.3.The evolution of mobility over time 
As a last step, we investigate how long-term mobility evolved over time. We look at a horizon of 
2 years and 4 year, both under a balanced and unbalanced approach. The results for the 2-year 
period mobility  illustrated in  Figure 14, reveal that  information provided  by the two indices 
differ to some extent. 
We  start  with  the  Shorrocks  index,  displayed  in  the  upper  panel  in  Figure  14.  The  largest 
differences  between  the  curves  for  the  balanced  and  unbalanced  approach  are  observed  in 
Denmark, France, UK, Ireland, Italy and Finland. The mobility based on the unbalanced sample 
is higher than the one based on the balanced one in Germany until 1996, in Denmark after 1997, 
in Netherlands after 1995, in Belgium after 1996, in Luxembourg after 1999, in France, in UK 
after 1997, in Ireland except in 1996, in Italy except 1997, in Greece until 1998, in Spain after 
1998, in Portugal except 1994, 1995 and 2000, in Austria after 1999, and in Finland except 1997.  
Despite these differences, the conclusions regarding the overall trend over the sample period do 
not differ to a large extent. Based on the balanced approach, the 2-year period mobility decreased 
over the sample period in all countries, except Ireland and Finland, showing that in 2000 men 
had a decreased opportunity of reducing earnings differentials over a 2-year period compared 
with  the  1
st  wave.  The  opposite  holds  in  Ireland  and  Finland.  The  unbalanced  approach  is 
consistent with the balanced one, except for Netherlands and Spain which record increases in the 
2-year period mobility.  
As revealed by Figure 14, the evolution of the Shorrocks index was not monotonic and the yearly 
trends differ between the balanced and unbalanced approach.  
We turn to the Fields index, displayed in the lower panel in Figure 14. Similar with the previous 
sections, the Fields index appears to have a higher sensitivity to attrition or to including also the 
people which become unemployed or inactive or find a job during the sample period than the 
Shorrocks  index.  The  highest  differences  are  observed  for  Denmark,  Netherlands,  Belgium, 
France, UK, Ireland, and Portugal. The conclusions on the overall trend however do not differ 
much.  
Based on the balanced approach, the evolution of the 2-year Fields index reveals that mobility 
became  less  equalizing  in  2000-2001  compared  with  the  first two  waves  in  most  countries, 30 
 
except Spain where it became more equalizing, and Netherlands, Portugal and Finland, where 2-
year  period  mobility  turned  disequalizing.  Based  on the  unbalanced  approach,  2-year  period 
mobility became more equalizing in Spain and Ireland, disequalizing in Netherlands and less 
equalizing in the other countries.  
Similar with the Shorrocks index, the evolution of the Fields index was not monotonic and the 
yearly trends differ between the balanced and unbalanced approach.  
Figure 15 shows the evolution of the 4-year mobility using both the Fields and the Shorrocks 
index. Based on the balanced approach (Panel A) using the Shorrocks index, long-term mobility 
decreased over time in all countries. The same is observed in the unbalanced approach (Panel B), 
except for Netherlands and Denmark where long-period mobility increased.  
The balanced approach (Panel A) using the Fields index reveals that the 4-year period mobility 
became  less  equalizing  over  time  in  all  countries,  except  Portugal,  where  it  became  more 
equalizing,  and  Italy  it  became  disequalizing.  The  unbalanced  approach  reveals  a  slightly 
different picture for some countries, highlighting again that the Fields index is more sensitive to 
differential attrition. The 4-year period mobility became less equalizing in all countries, except 
Spain  and  Netherlands.  No  country  records  disequalizing  mobilities  under  the  unbalanced 
approach. 
To sum up, under the balanced approach all countries record a decrease in long-term mobility 
which also becomes less equalizing in most countries. Exceptions are Italy where it becomes 
disequalizing, and Portugal, where it becomes more equalizing. The divergent trend between the 
Shorrocks and the Fields index might signal that Portugal records a decrease in the disequalizing 
part of mobility, which in turn increases the Fields index. 
Turning to the unbalanced approach, all countries except Netherlands and Denmark, record a 
decrease in long-term mobility, which also becomes less equalizing in all countries except Spain 
and Netherlands. The divergent trend between the two indices  in Spain and Denmark  might 
signal that Spain records a decrease in the disequalizing part of mobility, which in turn increases 
the Fields index, whereas Denmark records an increase in the disequalizing part of mobility, 
which in turn decreases the Fields index. In Netherlands long-term mobility increases, becoming 
more equalizing.  31 
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper explores the degree of lifetime earnings mobility for men in 14 EU countries using 
ECHP  between  1994  and  2001.  We  address  two  questions.  First,  do  EU  citizens  have  an 
increased opportunity to improve their position in the distribution of lifetime earnings? Second, 
to what extent does earnings mobility work to equalize/disequalize longer-term earnings relative 
to cross-sectional inequality and how does it differ across the EU? Moreover, we explored how 
the findings differ, first if we consider only individuals which record positive earnings in each 
year  between  1994  and  2001  –  “the  balanced  approach”,  and  second  if  we  consider  also 
individuals which do not record positive earnings in each year between 1994 and 2001, but only 
during the horizon over which mobility is measured – “the unbalanced approach”. The basic 
assumption is that mobility measured over a horizon of 8 years is a good proxy for lifetime 
mobility. 
The first question is answered by applying the Shorrocks (1978) index. We find that all countries 
record an increase in earnings mobility when the horizon over which mobility is measured is 
extended. This shows that men do have an increasing mobility in the distribution of lifetime 
earnings  as  they  advance  in  their  career,  result  confirmed  both  by  the  “balanced”  and  the 
“unbalanced” approach. Differential attrition appears to have a limited impact on the stability 
profiles, but a higher impact on the country ranking in Shorrock mobility.  
Using the  mobility  index computed over a horizon of 8 years, we conclude that the highest 
lifetime  mobility  is  recorded  in  Denmark,  followed  by  the  UK,  Belgium,  Greece,  Ireland, 
Netherlands,  Italy,  France,  Spain,  Germany,  and  the  lowest,  Portugal.  Therefore  Denmark 
provides  the  highest  opportunity  of  reducing  lifetime  earnings  differentials  and  Portugal  the 
lowest. Based on the 6-year mobility, Finland records the second highest lifetime mobility after 
Denmark. Based on the 7-year mobility, Austria records the second highest lifetime mobility 
after Denmark, and  Luxembourg the second  lowest after Portugal. Both approaches confirm 
these rankings. 
The main limitation of this approach is that it fails to answer our second question, whether this 
mobility  is  equalizing  or  disequalizing  lifetime  earnings  differentials.  To  overcome  this 
limitation  we  applied  the  newly  developed  Fields  index.  (Fields  2008)  In  general,  mobility 32 
 
increases with the horizon in all countries, except Portugal where mobility decreases with the 
horizon, turning negative when measured over an 8-year horizon. This finding is confirmed both 
by the balanced and the unbalanced approach. Thus only in Portugal mobility is exacerbating 
long-term  earning  differentials,  whereas  the  other  countries  manage  to  reduce  earnings 
differentials in a lifetime perspective.  
The Fields index however is affected to a larger extent by differential attrition than the Shorrocks 
index: the differentiation between the mobility profile under the balanced approach and the one 
under the unbalanced approach is evident in all countries, in some more than in others. The 
largest differences between the two curves are observed in Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Finland. 
Using the mobility index computed over a horizon of 8 years as proxy for lifetime mobility, we 
conclude  that  in  all  countries,  except  Portugal,  mobility  acts  as  an  equalizer  of  lifetime 
differentials. The highest mobility as equalizer of longer term inequality is recorded in Ireland 
and  Denmark,  followed  by  France  and  Belgium  with  similar  values,  then  UK,  Greece, 
Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Italy. Based on the 6-year mobility, Finland records the 7th 
highest  equalizing  mobility.  Based  on  the  7-year  mobility,  Austria  records  the  third  highest 
equalizing mobility after Ireland and Denmark, and Luxembourg the fifth lowest according to the 
balanced approach and the sixth lowest according to the unbalanced approach. 
Regarding the evolution of long-term mobility over time, the two indices bring complementary 
pieces of information. The longest time horizon to be followed over time in our data is of 4 
years. Due to the short horizon, the implications of the trends in the 4-year period mobility for 
the evolution of lifetime mobility should be regarded with caution. Some differences are present 
between the balanced and the unbalanced approach.  
Under the balanced approach all countries record a decrease in long-term mobility which also 
becomes less equalizing in most countries. Exceptions are Italy where it becomes disequalizing, 
and Portugal, where it becomes more equalizing. The divergent trend between the Shorrocks and 
the  Fields  index  might  signal  that  Portugal  records  a  decrease  in  the  disequalizing  part  of 
mobility, which in turn increases the Fields index. 
Turning to the unbalanced approach, all countries except Netherlands and Denmark, record a 
decrease in long-term mobility, which also becomes less equalizing in all countries except Spain 33 
 
and Netherlands. The divergent trend between the two indices  in Spain and Denmark  might 
signal that Spain records a decrease in the disequalizing part of mobility, which in turn increases 
the Fields index, whereas Denmark records an increase in the disequalizing part of mobility, 
which in turn decreases the Fields index. Netherlands records an increase in long-term mobility, 
which also becomes more equalizing.  
What are the possible  implications  for  lifetime  earnings  inequality, assuming that the 8-year 
period mobility is a good proxy for lifetime mobility? Among the countries which recorded an 
increase in annual earnings inequality over the sample period – Netherlands, Greece, Finland, 
Portugal, Luxembourg, Italy, and Germany - only in Portugal lifetime mobility is expected to 
exacerbate  annual  differentials  in  a  lifetime  perspective.  For  the  rest,  mobility  acts  as  an 
equalizer of lifetime differentials, thus counteracting the increase in annual inequality. For the 
countries recording a decrease in annual inequality – Ireland, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, 
France, and UK - lifetime mobility is expected to enhance the reduction in lifetime earnings 
differentials.  
Given these trends we expect Portugal to record the highest and Denmark the lowest lifetime 
earnings  inequality  among  the  14  EU  countries.  The  outstanding  performance  of  the  labour 
market  in  Denmark,  which  records  the  lowest  annual  earnings  inequality,  coupled  with  the 
highest lifetime mobility and the second highest equalizing lifetime mobility - might be due to 
the so called “flexicurity approach” (OECD, 2004), which represents an interesting combination 
of high labour market dynamism and a relatively high social protection. It is a mix of flexibility 
(a high degree of job mobility thanks to low employment protection legislation), social security 
(a  generous  system  of  unemployment  benefits)  and  active  labour  market  programmes.  The 
coupled  effect  of  these  factors  assures  a  small  annual  earnings  inequality  and  an  earnings 
mobility which acts as an equalizer of lifetime differentials, offering at the same time a high 
opportunity  to  low  wage  individuals  to  improve  their  relative  position  in  the  distribution  of 
lifetime earnings. 
Our paper has a threefold contribution to the existing literature. First, by exploring a different 
facet of mobility – as an equalizer or disequalizer of lifetime earnings differentials -, we fill part 
of the gap in the study of earnings mobility at the EU level. Second, we apply a new class of 
measures of  mobility as equalizer of  long-term  differentials - developed  by  Fields (2008) –, 34 
 
which complement the information provided by the well-known Shorrocks measure. Therefore 
we highlight once again the limitations of the Shorrocks measure put forward by Benabou and 
Ok (2001) and Fields (2008), and the need to provide additional measures for capturing the real 
nature of lifetime earnings mobility. Third, by comparing the findings between the “unbalanced” 
and the “balanced approach”, meaning between including/and not the individuals that exited and 
(re)entered the panel, we explored the impact of differentials attrition on the study of earnings 
mobility as an equalizer of long-term differentials. 
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Germany 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
25018  26059  25806  24889  23290  22955  21909  20703 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
11057 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  23956  25224  24197  22814  22321  21290  20107 
 
%  66.99  67.37  66.2  63.01  64.84  64.86  64.39 




Frequencies  3448  3461  4119  3932  3055  2787  2766 
%  9.64  9.24  11.27  10.86  8.87  8.49  8.86 
Attrition 
Frequencies  1885  2182  1892  3280  2951  2924  2830 
%  5.27  5.83  5.18  9.06  8.57  8.91  9.06 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  6470  6576  6345  6180  6100  5826  5524 
%  18.09  17.56  17.36  17.07  17.72  17.75  17.69 
Total 
 
Frequencies  35759  37443  36553  36206  34427  32827  31227 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Denmark 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
20899  20399  19190  19062  17321  16235  15678  15380 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
8247 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  19854  18527  18110  16442  15334  14865  14642 
 
%  68.74  66.59  69.43  66.23  67.41  69.6  71.6 




Frequencies  1535  1744  951  899  732  658  958 
%  5.31  6.27  3.65  3.62  3.22  3.08  4.68 
Attrition 
Frequencies  2440  3096  2914  3603  2922  2133  1775 
%  8.45  11.13  11.17  14.51  12.85  9.99  8.68 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  5054  4454  4110  3881  3759  3703  3074 
%  17.5  16.01  15.76  15.63  16.53  17.34  15.03 
Total 
 
Frequencies  28883  27821  26085  24825  22747  21359  20449 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Netherlands 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
20221  22100  22892  22753  22863  23233  24065  24130 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
8173 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  20578  21328  21221  21055  20545  21026  21341 
 
%  69.07  71.37  68.68  67.52  67.24  68.56  69.59 




Frequencies  2418  2356  2536  2120  1984  1840  1689 
%  8.12  7.88  8.21  6.8  6.49  6  5.51 
Attrition 
Frequencies  2941  1889  2591  3562  3984  4301  4891 
%  9.87  6.32  8.39  11.42  13.04  14.02  15.95 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  3857  4310  4550  4448  4042  3502  2745 
%  12.95  14.42  14.73  14.26  13.23  11.42  8.95 
Total 
 
Frequencies  29794  29883  30898  31185  30555  30669  30666 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Belgium 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
35342  34367  33280  32378  31129  29414  28087  26538 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
16910 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  33277  32384  31564  30575  28731  27460  25790 
 
%  63.43  63.65  64.38  63.88  64.28  65.15  64.38 




Frequencies  3810  5127  4378  3601  3040  3090  2540 
%  7.26  10.08  8.93  7.52  6.8  7.33  6.34 
Attrition 
Frequencies  4145  3798  3473  4803  4421  3851  4930 
%  7.9  7.46  7.08  10.04  9.89  9.14  12.31 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  11228  9573  9614  8882  8504  7748  6798 
%  21.4  18.81  19.61  18.56  19.03  18.38  16.97 
Total 
 
Frequencies  52460  50882  49029  47861  44696  42149  40058 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Luxembourg 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
  15829  13695  14489  13403  14075  12667  12992 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
  7283 









64.75  69.48  69.33  69.81  68.71  70.39 






1765  1559  1505  1408  1246  954 
% 
 




3423  1663  2109  1913  2346  1940 
% 
 




2116  2267  2220  1980  2057  1926 
% 
 





20721  17987  19024  17558  18051  16277 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – France 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 




Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
5895 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  19143  18197  17243  14014  12209  12080  12468 
 
%  62.47  64.76  62  52.08  54.24  55.54  60.8 




Frequencies  3259  3042  3426  3006  2607  2072  1995 
%  10.64  10.83  12.32  11.17  11.58  9.53  9.73 
Attrition 
Frequencies  3371  2213  2785  5584  3531  3786  2658 
%  11  7.88  10.01  20.75  15.69  17.41  12.96 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  4871  4646  4358  4304  4162  3811  3385 
%  15.9  16.53  15.67  16  18.49  17.52  16.51 
Total 
 
Frequencies  30644  28098  27812  26908  22509  21749  20506 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – UK 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
24949  25329  25495  26010  26145  25750  25674  25264 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
13977 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  24511  24848  25303  25278  25006  24881  24467 
 
%  64.59  66.31  67.06  67.04  67.36  68.33  68.58 




Frequencies  4712  5053  4663  4140  3941  3607  3595 
%  12.42  13.48  12.36  10.98  10.62  9.91  10.08 
Attrition 
Frequencies  1836  966  1169  2073  1919  2153  2105 
%  4.84  2.58  3.1  5.5  5.17  5.91  5.9 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  6888  6605  6597  6213  6257  5774  5510 
%  18.15  17.63  17.48  16.48  16.85  15.86  15.44 
Total 
 
Frequencies  37947  37472  37732  37704  37123  36415  35677 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Ireland 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
13937  13221  12590  12515  12435  12091  10745  9727 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
4453 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  12750  12217  12212  12020  11668  10236  9507 
 
%  49.99  50.04  52.41  53.13  54.1  51.63  54.65 




Frequencies  4930  4723  4254  3374  2905  2185  2307 
%  19.33  19.35  18.26  14.91  13.47  11.02  13.26 
Attrition 
Frequencies  2167  2115  1600  1936  2516  3288  2362 
%  8.5  8.66  6.87  8.56  11.66  16.59  13.58 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  5656  5359  5235  5292  4480  4116  3220 
%  22.18  21.95  22.47  23.39  20.77  20.76  18.51 
Total 
 
Frequencies  25503  24414  23301  22622  21569  19825  17396 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Italy 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
32633  32236  32111  29661  28865  26993  26912  25170 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
12070 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  30946  31028  28717  27188  25717  25348  24139 
 
%  51.58  51.19  47.18  47.34  46.87  48.73  48.86 




Frequencies  7900  7799  7670  6627  6890  5662  5027 
%  13.17  12.87  12.6  11.54  12.56  10.88  10.18 
Attrition 
Frequencies  3175  2947  5922  6030  5941  5399  5920 
%  5.29  4.86  9.73  10.5  10.83  10.38  11.98 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  17978  18836  18559  17585  16325  15610  14315 
%  29.96  31.08  30.49  30.62  29.75  30.01  28.98 
Total 
 
Frequencies  59999  60610  60868  57430  54873  52019  49401 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Greece 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
27974  27654  26150  24865  22675  22001  21335  21929 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
9404 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  26868  25946  24385  21815  20357  20443  21342 
 
%  45.83  45.69  44.98  42.09  43.52  46.06  49.72 




Frequencies  7537  6813  6419  4523  4489  4427  3858 
%  12.86  12  11.84  8.73  9.6  9.97  8.99 
Attrition 
Frequencies  4417  4392  4347  7892  6222  4159  2363 
%  7.53  7.73  8.02  15.23  13.3  9.37  5.5 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  19802  19640  19068  17599  15707  15352  15365 
%  33.78  34.58  35.17  33.96  33.58  34.59  35.79 
Total 
 
Frequencies  58624  56791  54219  51829  46775  44381  42928 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Spain 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
22559  21863  21296  20975  20371  20580  19898  20185 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
7234 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  21460  20521  20329  19456  19679  19167  19352 
 
%  47.6  48.29  48.49  48.63  52.13  52.12  56.06 




Frequencies  8419  8230  7353  5970  5083  4512  4761 
%  18.67  19.37  17.54  14.92  13.46  12.27  13.79 
Attrition 
Frequencies  4467  3000  4120  4327  3188  3922  3052 
%  9.91  7.06  9.83  10.81  8.44  10.66  8.84 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  10741  10742  10121  10259  9802  9176  7357 
%  23.82  25.28  24.14  25.64  25.96  24.95  21.31 
Total 
 
Frequencies  45087  42493  41923  40012  37752  36777  34522 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Portugal 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
14653  15450  15379  15087  14837  14569  14604  14550 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
6214 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  13892  14538  14321  13977  13921  13952  13942 
 
%  57.84  57.5  57.32  56.98  59.12  60.83  62.16 




Frequencies  2187  2264  2396  2019  2067  1843  1702 
%  9.11  8.95  9.59  8.23  8.78  8.04  7.59 
Attrition 
Frequencies  1701  1908  1918  2346  1956  1617  1575 
%  7.08  7.55  7.68  9.56  8.31  7.05  7.02 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  6236  6573  6350  6189  5602  5525  5211 
%  25.97  26  25.42  25.23  23.79  24.09  23.23 
Total 
 
Frequencies  24016  25283  24985  24531  23546  22937  22430 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Austria 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
  17944  17789  17199  16209  15162  13816  13056 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
  8127 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  16472  16384  15634  14551  13403  12601 
 
%  67.96  68.2  67.49  67.2  66.51  68.21 




Frequencies  1209  1231  906  790  803  843 
%  4.99  5.12  3.91  3.65  3.98  4.56 
Attrition 
Frequencies  2195  2080  2435  2470  2409  1794 
%  9.06  8.66  10.51  11.41  11.95  9.71 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  4361  4330  4189  3842  3538  3235 
%  17.99  18.02  18.08  17.74  17.56  17.51 
Total 
 
Frequencies  24237  24025  23164  21653  20153  18473 
% 
 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
 




1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 




15811  15845  15895  15546  13329  13057 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings over the entire sample 
  6913 




   
15246  15345  14753  12756  12588 
 
% 
   
55.95  57.2  59.29  53.83  64.16 





   
3446  2327  1657  1326  1267 
% 
   
12.65  8.67  6.66  5.6  6.46 
Attrition 
Frequencies 
   
1933  3219  2658  5219  1708 
% 
   
7.09  12  10.68  22.02  8.71 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies 
   
6623  5937  5814  4398  4057 
% 
   




   
27248  26828  24882  23699  19620 
% 
   
100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 2. Sample Statistics of Hourly Earnings 
 
Year  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Germany 
Mean  9.43  9.49  9.61  9.52  9.57  9.48  9.60  9.72 
Median  8.65  8.68  8.78  8.84  8.70  8.65  8.75  8.82 
Standard Deviation  4.00  4.17  4.09  4.01  4.39  4.32  4.39  4.37 
Denmark 
Mean  10.89  11.40  11.58  11.61  11.86  11.85  12.02  12.08 
Median  10.36  10.76  10.96  11.14  11.46  11.36  11.77  11.50 
Standard Deviation  3.23  3.31  3.52  3.54  3.13  3.31  3.43  3.20 
Netherlands 
Mean  9.69  9.56  9.59  9.70  10.02  9.88  10.04  9.91 
Median  9.11  9.07  9.01  9.10  9.27  9.18  9.32  9.23 
Standard Deviation  3.39  3.37  3.55  3.56  3.64  3.40  3.48  3.95 
Belgium 
Mean  8.48  8.82  8.71  8.75  8.81  8.83  8.92  9.10 
Median  7.86  8.17  7.99  8.09  8.08  8.34  8.25  8.30 
Standard Deviation  3.17  3.08  3.02  3.09  2.97  2.94  3.00  3.21 
Luxembourg 
Mean  16.18  15.81  16.73  17.39  17.15  17.22  17.10 
Median  14.90  14.52  15.31  15.72  15.60  15.65  15.29 
Standard Deviation  7.50  7.19  7.77  8.21  8.38  8.37  8.22 
France
16 
Mean  10.23  9.92  9.87  10.05  10.33  10.60  10.55  10.87 
Median  8.56  8.57  8.53  8.53  8.84  9.04  9.06  9.48 
Standard Deviation  5.82  5.33  5.17  5.65  5.62  5.78  5.51  5.72 
UK 
Mean  8.16  8.11  8.22  8.34  8.68  9.01  9.21  9.68 
Median  7.30  7.29  7.51  7.52  7.67  8.00  8.22  8.68 
Standard Deviation  3.99  3.95  3.80  3.79  4.01  4.13  4.24  4.49 
Ireland 
Mean  9.30  9.54  9.76  10.02  10.43  10.84  11.69  12.44 
Median  8.06  8.44  8.84  8.86  9.33  9.73  10.25  11.36 
Standard Deviation  5.14  4.99  4.85  4.98  5.17  5.02  5.24  5.15 
Italy 
Mean  7.16  6.91  6.96  7.05  7.29  7.37  7.28  7.32 
Median  6.65  6.32  6.43  6.48  6.69  6.76  6.59  6.67 
Standard Deviation  2.77  2.59  2.67  2.68  3.01  3.00  2.99  3.04 
Greece 
Mean  4.95  5.03  5.23  5.59  5.63  5.85  5.70  5.77 
Median  4.49  4.41  4.53  4.90  4.91  4.99  4.89  4.99 
Standard Deviation  2.33  2.42  2.43  2.91  2.87  3.14  3.07  3.21 
Spain 
Mean  6.83  6.95  7.09  6.89  7.18  7.37  7.45  7.42 
Median  5.86  5.82  5.92  5.72  6.04  6.15  6.29  6.33 
Standard Deviation  3.81  3.86  4.00  3.92  4.06  4.15  4.07  3.87 
Portugal 
Mean  3.70  3.74  3.84  3.92  3.99  4.08  4.31  4.46 
Median  2.92  2.82  2.98  3.03  3.05  3.08  3.29  3.34 
Standard Deviation  2.34  2.45  2.54  2.65  2.81  2.82  3.16  3.33 
Austria 
Mean    9.08  8.33  8.37  8.49  8.55  8.55  8.54 
Median    8.51  7.64  7.63  7.84  7.82  7.86  7.93 
Standard Deviation    3.52  3.00  3.07  2.95  2.89  2.84  2.82 
Finland 
Mean      7.89  8.01  8.41  8.45  8.66  8.86 
Median      7.48  7.57  7.85  7.90  8.18  7.97 
Standard Deviation      2.70  2.77  2.92  2.91  2.93  3.29 
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Table 3. Earnings Inequality (Index*100) 
    1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Germany 
Gini  22.15  22.34  22.04  21.89  22.58  22.81  22.75  22.54 
Theil  8.22  8.61  8.23  8.06  8.85  8.96  8.92  8.72 
A(1)  8.08  8.38  8.04  7.84  8.12  8.53  8.41  8.17 
Denmark 
Gini  15.76  15.26  15.52  15.21  14.24  14.68  14.94  14.05 
Theil  4.22  3.92  4.23  4.15  3.37  3.73  3.83  3.35 
A(1)  4.26  3.78  4.10  3.96  3.37  3.76  3.78  3.33 
Netherlands 
Gini  18.07  18.37  19.19  18.80  18.93  17.92  18.18  20.67 
Theil  5.63  5.76  6.32  6.07  5.96  5.40  5.56  7.25 
A(1)  5.56  5.77  6.33  5.90  5.65  5.18  5.44  7.08 
Belgium 
Gini  19.10  17.71  17.64  18.13  17.53  17.33  17.13  17.85 
Theil  6.23  5.37  5.35  5.58  5.15  5.11  5.04  5.48 
A(1)  5.92  4.95  5.04  5.24  4.85  4.92  4.69  5.14 
Luxembourg 
Gini    25.23  24.74  25.41  25.62  26.58  26.50  26.32 
Theil    10.09  9.85  10.24  10.37  11.19  11.15  10.89 
A(1)    9.88  10.00  10.16  10.02  10.95  11.09  10.66 
France 
Gini  27.62  26.47  26.26  27.23  27.28  27.41  26.83  26.49 
Theil  13.21  12.04  11.63  12.88  12.58  12.65  11.94  11.87 
A(1)  11.64  10.88  10.58  11.41  11.54  11.59  11.17  10.98 
UK 
Gini  24.26  24.22  23.35  23.36  23.54  23.25  23.35  23.51 
Theil  10.08  10.01  9.20  9.05  9.24  9.08  9.16  9.29 
A(1)  9.25  9.19  8.57  8.46  8.55  8.32  8.46  8.51 
Ireland 
Gini  27.59  26.87  25.76  25.47  25.00  23.39  22.77  21.70 
Theil  12.87  11.97  11.00  10.83  10.60  9.31  8.78  7.85 
A(1)  11.84  11.21  10.50  10.14  9.85  8.66  8.15  7.64 
Italy 
Gini  19.16  18.47  19.02  18.93  19.85  19.72  19.78  19.90 
Theil  6.51  6.08  6.42  6.29  7.13  7.01  7.08  7.19 
A(1)  5.99  5.58  5.91  5.78  6.41  6.30  6.33  6.39 
Greece 
Gini  23.62  24.37  23.80  25.55  25.66  26.98  26.51  26.37 
Theil  9.51  9.97  9.44  11.23  11.09  12.20  11.93  12.17 
A(1)  8.77  9.13  8.70  9.97  9.99  10.97  10.68  10.55 
Spain 
Gini  27.87  28.27  28.19  28.71  28.37  26.99  26.36  26.07 
Theil  13.08  13.22  13.36  13.67  13.47  12.69  12.09  11.47 
A(1)  11.84  12.13  11.94  12.33  12.17  11.07  10.60  10.28 
Portugal 
Gini  30.05  31.14  30.66  30.85  31.13  30.11  31.32  31.72 
Theil  15.79  16.93  16.76  17.27  18.01  17.21  18.86  19.27 
A(1)  13.23  14.16  13.80  14.05  14.37  13.55  14.60  14.92 
Austria 
Gini    19.49  18.34  18.34  17.39  17.07  16.72  16.85 
Theil    6.67  5.84  5.90  5.27  5.10  4.93  4.97 
A(1)    6.44  5.62  5.52  4.87  4.80  4.67  4.82 
Finland 
Gini      17.32  17.80  17.30  17.81  17.10  18.50 
Theil      5.22  5.46  5.23  5.38  5.08  5.98 
A(1)      4.94  5.29  4.83  5.19  4.76  5.53 44 
 
Table 4. Earnings Inequality (Theil) for Different Time Horizons - Balanced sample over sub-periods 
Inequality   Germany  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg  France  UK  Ireland  Italy  Greece  Spain  Portugal  Austria  Finland 
1994-1995  0.0655  0.0282  0.0431  0.0425  0.0971  0.0709  0.1042  0.0520  0.0744  0.0966  0.1340 
1994-1996  0.0644  0.0264  0.0431  0.0408  0.0908  0.0676  0.0917  0.0500  0.0737  0.0944  0.1380 
1994-1997  0.0624  0.0241  0.0416  0.0403  0.0889  0.0653  0.0866  0.0479  0.0728  0.0940  0.1388 
1994-1998  0.0617  0.0229  0.0407  0.0403  0.0881  0.0636  0.0822  0.0485  0.0715  0.0942  0.1373 
1994-1999  0.0611  0.0219  0.0401  0.0395  0.0871  0.0632  0.0791  0.0487  0.0714  0.0938  0.1382 
1994-2000  0.0604  0.0210  0.0393  0.0396  0.0854  0.0632  0.0749  0.0491  0.0702  0.0942  0.1400 
1994-2001  0.0600  0.0205  0.0395  0.0395  0.0847  0.0630  0.0718  0.0494  0.0698  0.0929  0.1423 
1995-1996  0.0658  0.0273  0.0453  0.0414  0.0701  0.0934  0.0695  0.0892  0.0514  0.0788  0.0955  0.1436  0.0438 
1995-1997  0.0631  0.0243  0.0424  0.0409  0.0671  0.0906  0.0662  0.0842  0.0486  0.0764  0.0953  0.1434  0.0411 
1995-1998  0.0623  0.0230  0.0412  0.0410  0.0667  0.0897  0.0644  0.0805  0.0495  0.0741  0.0956  0.1408  0.0394 
1995-1999  0.0616  0.0219  0.0404  0.0400  0.0667  0.0887  0.0640  0.0776  0.0497  0.0738  0.0952  0.1412  0.0380 
1995-2000  0.0609  0.0210  0.0396  0.0401  0.0665  0.0867  0.0641  0.0736  0.0501  0.0721  0.0957  0.1430  0.0375 
1995-2001  0.0605  0.0206  0.0399  0.0401  0.0664  0.0858  0.0640  0.0707  0.0504  0.0716  0.0941  0.1452  0.0371 
1996-1997  0.0644  0.0251  0.0438  0.0437  0.0666  0.0913  0.0691  0.0812  0.0497  0.0808  0.1003  0.1534  0.0435  0.0373 
1996-1998  0.0633  0.0233  0.0422  0.0431  0.0663  0.0902  0.0661  0.0783  0.0507  0.0769  0.0992  0.1467  0.0410  0.0347 
1996-1999  0.0625  0.0221  0.0413  0.0414  0.0665  0.0889  0.0654  0.0759  0.0508  0.0762  0.0979  0.1458  0.0390  0.0348 
1996-2000  0.0615  0.0211  0.0403  0.0415  0.0665  0.0867  0.0655  0.0719  0.0512  0.0740  0.0982  0.1469  0.0384  0.0342 
1996-2001  0.0611  0.0208  0.0408  0.0414  0.0665  0.0859  0.0652  0.0693  0.0515  0.0733  0.0960  0.1488  0.0379  0.0346 
1997-1998  0.0640  0.0234  0.0426  0.0461  0.0685  0.0937  0.0684  0.0804  0.0530  0.0799  0.1034  0.1465  0.0432  0.0361 
1997-1999  0.0632  0.0221  0.0417  0.0431  0.0682  0.0909  0.0675  0.0773  0.0527  0.0787  0.1002  0.1461  0.0401  0.0363 
1997-2000  0.0620  0.0213  0.0405  0.0430  0.0680  0.0879  0.0676  0.0726  0.0530  0.0759  0.1004  0.1475  0.0392  0.0355 
1997-2001  0.0616  0.0210  0.0413  0.0426  0.0678  0.0870  0.0672  0.0697  0.0531  0.0750  0.0974  0.1500  0.0386  0.0361 
1998-1999  0.0659  0.0236  0.0435  0.0438  0.0713  0.0921  0.0700  0.0784  0.0574  0.0817  0.1035  0.1464  0.0401  0.0389 
1998-2000  0.0638  0.0221  0.0415  0.0437  0.0703  0.0884  0.0698  0.0725  0.0565  0.0778  0.1030  0.1488  0.0393  0.0373 
1998-2001  0.0630  0.0217  0.0425  0.0434  0.0698  0.0873  0.0691  0.0693  0.0560  0.0767  0.0988  0.1522  0.0389  0.0379 
1999-2000  0.0644  0.0230  0.0424  0.0454  0.0717  0.0883  0.0746  0.0732  0.0575  0.0805  0.1053  0.1546  0.0404  0.0404 
1999-2001  0.0634  0.0224  0.0438  0.0450  0.0708  0.0872  0.0725  0.0690  0.0567  0.0784  0.0990  0.1585  0.0397  0.0409 
2000-2001  0.0642  0.0239  0.0463  0.0481  0.0722  0.0877  0.0761  0.0690  0.0587  0.0787  0.1010  0.1666  0.0421  0.0432 45 
 
Table 5. Earnings Inequality (Theil) for Different Time Horizons - Unbalanced sample over sub-periods 
Germany  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg  France  UK  Ireland  Italy  Greece  Spain  Portugal  Austria  Finland 
1994-1995  0.0744  0.0316  0.0468  0.0496  0.106  0.0866  0.1109  0.054  0.0801  0.1179  0.1524 
1994-1996  0.0714  0.0288  0.0458  0.0454  0.0958  0.0775  0.0979  0.0512  0.0745  0.1124  0.1474 
1994-1997  0.0688  0.0266  0.0443  0.043  0.0931  0.0726  0.0916  0.0495  0.0767  0.1078  0.1449 
1994-1998  0.0655  0.0252  0.0435  0.0419  0.0929  0.0685  0.086  0.0497  0.0729  0.106  0.144 
1994-1999  0.0623  0.0232  0.0424  0.0399  0.0915  0.0653  0.0819  0.049  0.0756  0.1046  0.1381 
1994-2000  0.0602  0.0211  0.0416  0.0388  0.0874  0.0635  0.0786  0.0496  0.0732  0.1  0.1393 
1994-2001  0.06  0.0205  0.0395  0.0395  0.0847  0.063  0.0718  0.0494  0.0698  0.0929  0.1423 
1995-1996  0.0751  0.0329  0.0512  0.0472  0.0869  0.1029  0.0816  0.1001  0.0547  0.0852  0.1209  0.1578  0.0514 
1995-1997  0.0718  0.0293  0.0465  0.0442  0.0786  0.099  0.0757  0.0943  0.0522  0.0849  0.1158  0.1536  0.0479 
1995-1998  0.0675  0.0275  0.0449  0.0425  0.0751  0.0989  0.0711  0.0875  0.0521  0.0797  0.1132  0.1539  0.043 
1995-1999  0.0632  0.0238  0.043  0.0403  0.074  0.0972  0.0675  0.0833  0.0503  0.0815  0.1119  0.1471  0.0399 
1995-2000  0.0605  0.0218  0.0415  0.0393  0.0678  0.093  0.0654  0.081  0.0504  0.0795  0.106  0.1511  0.0372 
1995-2001  0.0606  0.021  0.0391  0.0395  0.0664  0.0903  0.0641  0.0718  0.0504  0.0767  0.0985  0.1501  0.0371 
1996-1997  0.0735  0.0353  0.0524  0.0475  0.0843  0.1071  0.0803  0.0994  0.0564  0.0933  0.1239  0.1582  0.0512  0.0422 
1996-1998  0.0694  0.0282  0.0481  0.045  0.0802  0.1059  0.0736  0.0907  0.0556  0.0857  0.118  0.1586  0.0438  0.0398 
1996-1999  0.0647  0.0245  0.045  0.042  0.0787  0.1031  0.0696  0.0854  0.0532  0.0882  0.1144  0.1507  0.0406  0.036 
1996-2000  0.0619  0.0229  0.0428  0.0407  0.0735  0.0985  0.0674  0.0818  0.0528  0.0854  0.1085  0.1556  0.0377  0.0351 
1996-2001  0.0619  0.0221  0.0403  0.0405  0.0706  0.0927  0.0657  0.0729  0.0523  0.0821  0.0994  0.1548  0.0373  0.0346 
1997-1998  0.0723  0.0289  0.0509  0.0483  0.0918  0.1148  0.0798  0.0951  0.0594  0.0964  0.1244  0.1727  0.0477  0.0453 
1997-1999  0.0663  0.025  0.0463  0.0433  0.0889  0.1093  0.0742  0.0881  0.0561  0.0977  0.1158  0.1633  0.0433  0.0399 
1997-2000  0.0634  0.0232  0.0435  0.0418  0.0832  0.1014  0.0708  0.084  0.0557  0.0951  0.1084  0.1703  0.0399  0.0376 
1997-2001  0.0628  0.0223  0.0411  0.0417  0.0784  0.0943  0.0686  0.0745  0.0546  0.0919  0.0984  0.1723  0.0385  0.0368 
1998-1999  0.0793  0.0272  0.0501  0.0446  0.0949  0.1145  0.0803  0.092  0.0631  0.1082  0.1204  0.1696  0.0469  0.0424 
1998-2000  0.0762  0.0245  0.045  0.0432  0.0881  0.1049  0.0761  0.0839  0.061  0.1029  0.1096  0.1698  0.0423  0.0384 
1998-2001  0.0749  0.0234  0.043  0.0425  0.0821  0.0973  0.073  0.0742  0.0587  0.0998  0.0994  0.1696  0.0402  0.037 
1999-2000  0.0827  0.0305  0.0453  0.0458  0.0989  0.1095  0.0811  0.0836  0.0645  0.1128  0.1105  0.171  0.0445  0.044 
1999-2001  0.0772  0.0273  0.0443  0.0436  0.0889  0.101  0.0763  0.0735  0.0618  0.1071  0.0987  0.1719  0.0421  0.0419 
2000-2001  0.0788  0.0294  0.0516  0.0474  0.0957  0.1061  0.0814  0.0744  0.0657  0.1098  0.1032  0.1836  0.0445  0.0466 
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Table 6. Shorrocks Mobility based on Theil for Different Time Horizons - Balanced sample over sub-periods 
shor bal  Germany  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg  France  UK  Ireland  Italy  Greece  Spain  Portugal  Austria  Finland 
1994-1995  0.0539  0.0994  0.0807  0.1044  0.0989  0.0919  0.0588  0.0741  0.1125  0.0698  0.0496 
1994-1996  0.0749  0.1588  0.1002  0.1325  0.1260  0.1332  0.1054  0.1027  0.1285  0.0964  0.0689 
1994-1997  0.0912  0.1922  0.1161  0.1543  0.1328  0.1471  0.1178  0.1240  0.1489  0.1096  0.0769 
1994-1998  0.1021  0.2152  0.1316  0.1576  0.1313  0.1637  0.1335  0.1358  0.1601  0.1173  0.0816 
1994-1999  0.1115  0.2333  0.1460  0.1698  0.1305  0.1688  0.1475  0.1418  0.1664  0.1221  0.0795 
1994-2000  0.1170  0.2555  0.1580  0.1772  0.1343  0.1799  0.1655  0.1451  0.1745  0.1286  0.0800 
1994-2001  0.1240  0.2670  0.1729  0.1850  0.1348  0.1857  0.1757  0.1489  0.1803  0.1321  0.0932 
1995-1996  0.0451  0.1123  0.0557  0.0789  0.0581  0.0676  0.0955  0.0728  0.0635  0.0670  0.0662  0.0515  0.1159 
1995-1997  0.0723  0.1592  0.0925  0.1195  0.0874  0.0895  0.1215  0.0924  0.0966  0.1088  0.0869  0.0632  0.1690 
1995-1998  0.0866  0.1893  0.1157  0.1283  0.0922  0.0923  0.1409  0.1082  0.1140  0.1299  0.0991  0.0696  0.1793 
1995-1999  0.0983  0.2111  0.1343  0.1461  0.0948  0.0949  0.1497  0.1259  0.1225  0.1408  0.1061  0.0687  0.1894 
1995-2000  0.1051  0.2368  0.1484  0.1563  0.0992  0.1026  0.1631  0.1461  0.1273  0.1521  0.1139  0.0700  0.1932 
1995-2001  0.1129  0.2479  0.1642  0.1657  0.1036  0.1060  0.1689  0.1574  0.1326  0.1598  0.1188  0.0853  0.1979 
1996-1997  0.0540  0.1169  0.0724  0.0867  0.0563  0.0608  0.0811  0.0642  0.0662  0.0715  0.0644  0.0339  0.1151  0.1004 
1996-1998  0.0744  0.1634  0.0994  0.1049  0.0727  0.0715  0.1155  0.0854  0.0952  0.1045  0.0855  0.0508  0.1348  0.1501 
1996-1999  0.0882  0.1900  0.1206  0.1308  0.0796  0.0792  0.1301  0.1083  0.1078  0.1192  0.0957  0.0536  0.1528  0.1728 
1996-2000  0.0962  0.2200  0.1360  0.1419  0.0863  0.0891  0.1471  0.1321  0.1141  0.1331  0.1049  0.0585  0.1602  0.1886 
1996-2001  0.1046  0.2305  0.1526  0.1520  0.0918  0.0935  0.1546  0.1441  0.1207  0.1420  0.1115  0.0774  0.1682  0.2184 
1997-1998  0.0528  0.1019  0.0597  0.0605  0.0570  0.0405  0.0662  0.0525  0.0659  0.0695  0.0585  0.0312  0.0730  0.1031 
1997-1999  0.0709  0.1424  0.0914  0.1047  0.0689  0.0595  0.0926  0.0845  0.0850  0.0920  0.0810  0.0375  0.1110  0.1366 
1997-2000  0.0821  0.1816  0.1151  0.1207  0.0766  0.0738  0.1162  0.1128  0.0956  0.1099  0.0926  0.0471  0.1286  0.1564 
1997-2001  0.0924  0.1944  0.1349  0.1338  0.0829  0.0798  0.1269  0.1271  0.1047  0.1221  0.1024  0.0702  0.1404  0.1922 
1998-1999  0.0442  0.0950  0.0691  0.0779  0.0344  0.0393  0.0696  0.0613  0.0501  0.0503  0.0524  0.0216  0.0678  0.0885 
1998-2000  0.0622  0.1575  0.1025  0.1030  0.0507  0.0587  0.1014  0.1001  0.0692  0.0772  0.0738  0.0359  0.0982  0.1222 
1998-2001  0.0779  0.1732  0.1243  0.1172  0.0621  0.0676  0.1134  0.1171  0.0836  0.0958  0.0894  0.0629  0.1131  0.1689 
1999-2000  0.0466  0.1136  0.0843  0.0672  0.0374  0.0447  0.0609  0.0762  0.0483  0.0498  0.0539  0.0221  0.0682  0.0796 
1999-2001  0.0681  0.1398  0.1122  0.0891  0.0525  0.0580  0.0844  0.1033  0.0707  0.0794  0.0809  0.0522  0.0950  0.1376 
2000-2001  0.0512  0.0971  0.0794  0.0550  0.0368  0.0425  0.0543  0.0679  0.0493  0.0585  0.0623  0.0419  0.0579  0.1066 
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Table 7. Shorrocks Mobility based on Theil for Different Time Horizons - unbalanced sample over sub-periods 
shor unbal  Germany  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg  France  UK  Ireland  Italy  Greece  Spain  Portugal  Austria  Finland 
1994-1995  0.0525  0.1081  0.0777  0.1061  0.1072  0.0884  0.0773  0.0852  0.1298  0.0652  0.0479 
1994-1996  0.0863  0.1557  0.0966  0.1300  0.1304  0.1277  0.1160  0.1056  0.1452  0.0926  0.0685 
1994-1997  0.0934  0.1859  0.1107  0.1547  0.1409  0.1488  0.1284  0.1224  0.1561  0.1017  0.0793 
1994-1998  0.0921  0.2174  0.1266  0.1589  0.1404  0.1651  0.1458  0.1368  0.1679  0.1073  0.0803 
1994-1999  0.1076  0.2345  0.1412  0.1708  0.1410  0.1717  0.1601  0.1451  0.1686  0.1085  0.0795 
1994-2000  0.1150  0.2603  0.1498  0.1865  0.1366  0.1797  0.1652  0.1452  0.1753  0.1199  0.0798 
1994-2001  0.1240  0.2670  0.1729  0.1850  0.1348  0.1857  0.1757  0.1489  0.1803  0.1321  0.0932 
1995-1996  0.0752  0.1051  0.0595  0.0775  0.0508  0.0774  0.0901  0.0739  0.0682  0.0727  0.0647  0.0432  0.1077 
1995-1997  0.0898  0.1533  0.0960  0.1217  0.0764  0.1053  0.1187  0.0949  0.0990  0.1139  0.0811  0.0640  0.1497 
1995-1998  0.0828  0.1905  0.1147  0.1303  0.0832  0.1051  0.1433  0.1131  0.1174  0.1397  0.0907  0.0722  0.1673 
1995-1999  0.0999  0.2192  0.1336  0.1484  0.0885  0.1062  0.1564  0.1294  0.1315  0.1435  0.0960  0.0747  0.1769 
1995-2000  0.1086  0.2409  0.1438  0.1650  0.0998  0.1063  0.1656  0.1509  0.1321  0.1484  0.1077  0.0767  0.1931 
1995-2001  0.1162  0.2461  0.1677  0.1669  0.1036  0.1065  0.1762  0.1644  0.1340  0.1553  0.1194  0.0927  0.1979 
1996-1997  0.0576  0.0997  0.0737  0.0903  0.0547  0.0710  0.0816  0.0542  0.0748  0.0805  0.0585  0.0396  0.0913  0.1109 
1996-1998  0.0699  0.1692  0.0982  0.1033  0.0700  0.0819  0.1183  0.0870  0.1012  0.1154  0.0787  0.0522  0.1206  0.1495 
1996-1999  0.0896  0.1996  0.1238  0.1306  0.0791  0.0920  0.1369  0.1110  0.1185  0.1204  0.0892  0.0586  0.1442  0.1734 
1996-2000  0.0998  0.2265  0.1367  0.1491  0.0892  0.0926  0.1538  0.1394  0.1195  0.1312  0.1012  0.0621  0.1674  0.1879 
1996-2001  0.1075  0.2357  0.1635  0.1523  0.0935  0.0954  0.1663  0.1513  0.1238  0.1377  0.1136  0.0810  0.1755  0.2184 
1997-1998  0.0498  0.1203  0.0706  0.0780  0.0459  0.0563  0.0738  0.0652  0.0647  0.0790  0.0556  0.0309  0.0718  0.0977 
1997-1999  0.0747  0.1670  0.1034  0.1095  0.0603  0.0726  0.1098  0.0955  0.0937  0.0986  0.0771  0.0416  0.1072  0.1464 
1997-2000  0.0854  0.2006  0.1218  0.1305  0.0719  0.0801  0.1249  0.1231  0.0992  0.1136  0.0938  0.0515  0.1408  0.1651 
1997-2001  0.0966  0.2118  0.1456  0.1365  0.0788  0.0864  0.1377  0.1356  0.1080  0.1229  0.1110  0.0702  0.1532  0.1953 
1998-1999  0.0428  0.1161  0.0699  0.0811  0.0318  0.0494  0.0784  0.0679  0.0662  0.0563  0.0554  0.0253  0.0647  0.1010 
1998-2000  0.0583  0.1759  0.1074  0.1066  0.0487  0.0674  0.1035  0.1084  0.0814  0.0813  0.0777  0.0438  0.1087  0.1354 
1998-2001  0.0715  0.1923  0.1352  0.1190  0.0599  0.0760  0.1221  0.1317  0.0955  0.0953  0.1007  0.0654  0.1267  0.1748 
1999-2000  0.0437  0.1136  0.0869  0.0714  0.0408  0.0476  0.0716  0.0778  0.0562  0.0469  0.0615  0.0301  0.0773  0.1052 
1999-2001  0.0630  0.1472  0.1239  0.0938  0.0525  0.0614  0.1005  0.1142  0.0792  0.0714  0.0966  0.0552  0.1033  0.1494 
2000-2001  0.0455  0.1079  0.0824  0.0569  0.0420  0.0554  0.0725  0.0783  0.0604  0.0582  0.0781  0.0400  0.0620  0.1141 48 
 
Table 8. Fields Mobility based on Theil for Different Time Horizons - Balanced sample over sub-periods 
Fields bal  Germany  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg  France  UK  Ireland  Italy  Greece  Spain  Portugal  Austria  Finland 
1994-1995  0.0750  0.1419  0.1012  0.1772  0.1277  0.1178  0.1042  0.0913  0.1222  0.1155  0.0524 
1994-1996  0.0917  0.1964  0.1002  0.2087  0.1843  0.1585  0.2116  0.1276  0.1307  0.1354  0.0236 
1994-1997  0.1191  0.2673  0.1326  0.2192  0.2017  0.1868  0.2557  0.1634  0.1415  0.1392  0.0180 
1994-1998  0.1286  0.3032  0.1513  0.2185  0.2091  0.2086  0.2930  0.1534  0.1568  0.1372  0.0286 
1994-1999  0.1378  0.3347  0.1642  0.2345  0.2175  0.2126  0.3200  0.1504  0.1574  0.1405  0.0225 
1994-2000  0.1476  0.3607  0.1801  0.2331  0.2331  0.2129  0.3560  0.1432  0.1726  0.1367  0.0093 
1994-2001  0.1533  0.3762  0.1751  0.2349  0.2397  0.2161  0.3823  0.1379  0.1770  0.1485  -0.0067 
1995-1996  0.0281  0.0862  0.0116  0.0475  0.1209  0.1036  0.0827  0.1542  0.0676  0.0500  0.0338  -0.0219  0.1255 
1995-1997  0.0690  0.1866  0.0738  0.0596  0.1578  0.1303  0.1258  0.2019  0.1178  0.0788  0.0357  -0.0205  0.1790 
1995-1998  0.0796  0.2302  0.1006  0.0571  0.1629  0.1383  0.1496  0.2369  0.1029  0.1064  0.0326  -0.0018  0.2120 
1995-1999  0.0900  0.2670  0.1168  0.0795  0.1634  0.1485  0.1549  0.2641  0.0994  0.1108  0.0373  -0.0047  0.2410 
1995-2000  0.1015  0.2961  0.1358  0.0764  0.1653  0.1679  0.1539  0.3026  0.0910  0.1311  0.0320  -0.0175  0.2508 
1995-2001  0.1072  0.3108  0.1279  0.0777  0.1670  0.1760  0.1561  0.3300  0.0857  0.1374  0.0476  -0.0333  0.2590 
1996-1997  0.0815  0.2055  0.1250  0.0580  0.0351  0.0504  0.1125  0.0705  0.0908  0.0593  0.0510  0.0500  0.1116  0.1168 
1996-1998  0.0967  0.2619  0.1572  0.0710  0.0387  0.0614  0.1509  0.1037  0.0721  0.1047  0.0609  0.0917  0.1628  0.1775 
1996-1999  0.1092  0.3017  0.1751  0.1071  0.0362  0.0752  0.1601  0.1317  0.0706  0.1129  0.0734  0.0972  0.2031  0.1754 
1996-2000  0.1228  0.3310  0.1954  0.1058  0.0363  0.0981  0.1596  0.1774  0.0622  0.1381  0.0707  0.0903  0.2151  0.1905 
1996-2001  0.1287  0.3432  0.1855  0.1089  0.0364  0.1062  0.1629  0.2076  0.0575  0.1458  0.0911  0.0784  0.2251  0.1797 
1997-1998  0.0306  0.0753  0.0415  0.0661  0.0480  0.0460  0.0579  0.0683  -0.0221  0.0927  0.0482  0.0622  0.1247  0.1136 
1997-1999  0.0436  0.1248  0.0602  0.1272  0.0529  0.0745  0.0709  0.1041  -0.0176  0.1062  0.0776  0.0650  0.1876  0.1079 
1997-2000  0.0610  0.1589  0.0880  0.1293  0.0559  0.1048  0.0692  0.1583  -0.0225  0.1380  0.0763  0.0557  0.2057  0.1272 
1997-2001  0.0672  0.1699  0.0704  0.1356  0.0581  0.1145  0.0746  0.1923  -0.0244  0.1483  0.1037  0.0400  0.2169  0.1130 
1998-1999  0.0468  0.1193  0.0576  0.1018  0.0280  0.0513  0.0535  0.0601  0.0655  0.0241  0.0669  -0.0004  0.0861  0.0222 
1998-2000  0.0768  0.1751  0.1005  0.1042  0.0407  0.0897  0.0556  0.1317  0.0794  0.0699  0.0718  -0.0172  0.1048  0.0615 
1998-2001  0.0887  0.1897  0.0786  0.1090  0.0485  0.1007  0.0650  0.1701  0.0886  0.0841  0.1099  -0.0403  0.1129  0.0477 
1999-2000  0.0637  0.0926  0.1034  0.0184  0.0348  0.0682  0.0238  0.1254  0.0327  0.0878  0.0213  -0.0121  0.0408  0.1128 
1999-2001  0.0776  0.1151  0.0734  0.0277  0.0468  0.0793  0.0513  0.1748  0.0470  0.1115  0.0805  -0.0378  0.0579  0.1015 
2000-2001  0.0314  0.1008  -0.0225  0.0582  0.0333  0.0273  0.0757  0.0812  0.0443  0.0289  0.1212  -0.0216  0.0554  -0.0216 
   49 
 
Table 9. Fields Mobility based on Theil for Different Time Horizons - Unbalanced sample over sub-periods 
Germany  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg  France  UK  Ireland  Italy  Greece  Spain  Portugal  Austria  Finland 
1994-1995  0.0666  0.1678  0.0851  0.1702  0.1532  0.1159  0.1272  0.0938  0.1314  0.0913  0.0568 
1994-1996  0.1146  0.1994  0.0873  0.2046  0.1939  0.1766  0.2325  0.1222  0.1502  0.12  0.0633 
1994-1997  0.1289  0.2599  0.099  0.2014  0.2223  0.2224  0.2785  0.1406  0.1496  0.1176  0.0638 
1994-1998  0.1052  0.2722  0.115  0.2176  0.2244  0.2154  0.3285  0.1221  0.1231  0.1399  0.0489 
1994-1999  0.1208  0.3089  0.1402  0.2372  0.2384  0.2244  0.3742  0.1409  0.1304  0.1403  0.0695 
1994-2000  0.1413  0.3558  0.1602  0.2321  0.2312  0.2228  0.3416  0.1453  0.167  0.1364  0.0484 
1994-2001  0.1533  0.3762  0.1751  0.2349  0.2397  0.2161  0.3823  0.1379  0.177  0.1485  -0.0067 
1995-1996  0.1099  0.1084  0.0526  0.0867  0.0801  0.1041  0.1021  0.122  0.0691  0.0841  0.057  0.0229  0.1304 
1995-1997  0.148  0.1781  0.0793  0.112  0.1185  0.1187  0.1442  0.1766  0.1073  0.0771  0.0558  0.0565  0.1896 
1995-1998  0.0936  0.2335  0.1159  0.1108  0.1348  0.1139  0.1841  0.222  0.0979  0.1122  0.0666  0.0486  0.2505 
1995-1999  0.1196  0.2991  0.1426  0.1399  0.1419  0.0871  0.1921  0.2488  0.1036  0.0714  0.069  0.0699  0.2258 
1995-2000  0.1311  0.3198  0.1611  0.1348  0.1605  0.1223  0.1681  0.3086  0.1137  0.0854  0.0665  0.0266  0.2389 
1995-2001  0.1351  0.3384  0.1488  0.1268  0.167  0.1537  0.1767  0.3537  0.1064  0.1106  0.0786  -0.0093  0.259 
1996-1997  0.0675  0.1172  0.1106  0.0745  0.0774  0.0257  0.0977  0.0879  0.0866  0.0224  0.0591  0.0311  0.1005  0.1035 
1996-1998  0.0845  0.2303  0.1546  0.0864  0.0886  0.0469  0.1519  0.1278  0.0853  0.091  0.0911  0.0508  0.1729  0.1319 
1996-1999  0.113  0.2993  0.1917  0.1355  0.0766  0.0514  0.1856  0.1792  0.0822  0.0804  0.0978  0.0889  0.2138  0.1387 
1996-2000  0.1273  0.3295  0.2202  0.1459  0.0954  0.0838  0.1962  0.2479  0.0825  0.081  0.1127  0.0819  0.2267  0.1718 
1996-2001  0.1333  0.3475  0.23  0.1603  0.0987  0.103  0.197  0.2749  0.0891  0.103  0.1308  0.0628  0.2495  0.1797 
1997-1998  0.0358  0.14  0.07  0.1123  0.0381  0.0903  0.0898  0.0694  0.0103  0.0938  0.0788  0.0141  0.1109  0.114 
1997-1999  0.0479  0.1927  0.112  0.1488  0.059  0.1142  0.1264  0.145  0.0341  0.1041  0.1098  0.0154  0.1805  0.1433 
1997-2000  0.0664  0.1785  0.1525  0.167  0.0664  0.1255  0.1272  0.2211  0.0298  0.1359  0.1377  0.0002  0.2255  0.1852 
1997-2001  0.0845  0.1686  0.1332  0.1496  0.0872  0.1389  0.1332  0.2484  0.0493  0.0865  0.1563  0.0101  0.2568  0.1846 
1998-1999  0.0557  0.122  0.1161  0.1055  0.0328  0.0578  0.0837  0.1194  0.0699  0.045  0.0705  0.0198  0.0999  0.0799 
1998-2000  0.0799  0.1547  0.166  0.1275  0.0586  0.1113  0.1136  0.2005  0.0948  0.0738  0.1154  0.0262  0.148  0.1362 
1998-2001  0.1057  0.1787  0.1569  0.1262  0.0829  0.1396  0.1314  0.2562  0.1045  0.0773  0.156  0.0168  0.1904  0.1325 
1999-2000  0.0418  0.1398  0.1005  0.0615  0.0397  0.0971  0.0592  0.1234  0.0411  0.0607  0.0742  -0.0236  0.0735  0.1216 
1999-2001  0.0826  0.1958  0.0849  0.0672  0.0625  0.1176  0.0931  0.1839  0.0603  0.088  0.1497  -0.0165  0.1347  0.1419 
2000-2001  0.0529  0.1648  -0.0183  0.05  0.0724  0.0665  0.1024  0.1278  0.0511  0.0497  0.1209  0.0284  0.0556  0.0227 
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Table 10. Dominance relations in long term earnings mobility: Shorrocks and Fields Index 
  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium  Luxembourg*  France  UK  Ireland  Italy  Greece  Spain  Portugal  Austria*  Finland**   
Germany 
<  <  <  >  <  <  <  <  <  <  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
<  <  <  <  <  <  <  >  <  >  >  <  <  Fields 
 
Denmark 
>  >  >  >  >  >  >  >  >  >  >  >  Shorrocks 
  >  >  >  >  >  <  >  >  >  >  >  >  Fields 
   
Netherlands 
<  >  >  <  <  >  <  >  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
    <  >
1  <  <  <  >  <  >  >  <  <  Fields 
     
Belgium 
>  >  <  >  >  >  >  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
      >  <  >  <  >  >  >  >  <  >  Fields 
       
Luxembourg* 
<  <  <  <  <  <  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
        <  <  <  >  <
2  >  >  <  <  Fields 
         
France 
<  <  <  <  >  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
          >  <  >  >  >  >  <  >  Fields 
           
UK 
>  >  >  >  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
            <  >  >  >  >  <  >  Fields 
             
Ireland 
>  <  >  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
              >  >  >  >  >  >  Fields 
               
Italy 
<  >  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
                <  <  >  <  <  Fields 
                 
Greece 
>  >  <  <  Shorrocks 
                  >  >  <  <  Fields 
                   
Spain 
>  <  <  Shorrocks 
                    >  <  <  Fields 
                      Portugal  <  <  Shorrocks 
                      <  <  Fields 
                       
Austria* 
<  Shorrocks 
                        >  Fields 
                         
Finland** 
 
                           
 
Note: The reading of the table goes from left to right. 
(*) The comparison is based on 7-year period mobility 
(**) The comparison is based on 7-year period mobility  
(1) Based on the balanced approach. The reverse holds under the unbalanced approach  
(2) Based on the balanced approach. Under the unbalanced approach, they are equal 51 
 
 
Figure 1. Epanechinov Kernel Density Estimates for Selected Years17 - EU 15 
                                                              


























































































































































































Figure 2. Percentage Change in Mean Hourly Earnings by Percentiles Over The Sample 
Period 
 












































































































































Figure 4. Relative Change in Inequality over Time – Gini, Theil, Atkinson(1), D9/D118 
 
 
Figure 5. Short and Long Term Income Inequality and their Relative Difference 
Note: 1.Short–term refers to inequality in average earnings measured over two years, meaning in the first and the second wave, 
and long-term refers to inequality in average earnings measured over the sample period.  
          2. The right graph in each panel illustrates the relative difference between short and long term inequality displayed in the 
left graphs. 
                                                              

































































































































































































Panel B: Unbalanced sample over sub-periods54 
 
 
Figure 6. Stability Profiles for Male Earnings by Selected Countries (based on Theil) – Balanced vs Unbalanced 
Note: The stability profile plots the rigidity index against the horizon over which the index is measured: 1-year rigidity = 1; 2-year rigidity = rigidity index over a 
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Span(wave(1) - wave(t))
Finland
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Figure 7. Stability Profiles for Male Earnings for Selected Countries (based on Theil) - – 
Balanced vs Unbalanced 
Note: The stability profile plots the rigidity index against the horizon over which the index is measured: 1-year 
rigidity = 1; 2-year rigidity = rigidity index over a horizon of 2 years, span wave(1)-wave(2); 8-year rigidity = 


















































Panel B: Unbalanced sample over sub-periods56 
 
 
Figure 8. Long-Term Earnings Mobility based on the Shorrocks Index 
Note: Ranked in an ascendant order based on the 8-year period mobility. Austria Finland and Luxembourg are 


















































Panel A: Balanced sample over sub-periods
6-Year Period Shorrocks Mobility
7-Year Period Shorrocks Mobility

















































Panel B: Unbalanced sample over sub-periods
6-Year Period Shorrocks Mobility
7-Year Period Shorrocks Mobility
8-Year Period Shorrocks Mobility57 
 
 
Figure 9. Mobility Profile based on the Fields Index 
Note: The mobility profile plots the Fields index against the horizon over which the index is measured: 1-year mobility = 1; 2-year mobility = mobility index over a horizon of 2 
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Figure 10. Mobility Profile based on the Fields Index 
Note: The mobility profile plots the Fields index against the horizon over which the index is measured: 1-year mobility = 1; 2-
year mobility = mobility index over a horizon of 2 years, span wave(1)-wave(2); 8-year mobility = mobility index over a horizon 


























































Panel B: Unbalanced sample over sub-periods59 
 
 
Figure 11. Long-Term Earnings Mobility (Fields) 
Note: Ranked in an ascendant order based on the 8-year period mobility. Austria Finland and Luxembourg are 


















































Panel A: Balanced sample over sub-periods
6-Year Period Fields Mobility
7-Year Period Fields Mobility
















































Panel B: Unbalanced sample over sub-periods
6-Year Period Fields Mobility
7-Year Period Fields Mobility
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Panel B: Unbalanced sample over sub-periods61 
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2-Year Fields Mobility Over Time63 
 
 
Figure 15. The Evolution of Long-Term Mobility Over Time 
Note:   (*) For Luxembourg and Austria the figure displays the value for 1995-1998, and for Finland for 1996-
1999 






































































































































































































Panel B: Unbalanced sample over sub-periods64 
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